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I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation of every lawyer-client relationship is trust.' Whether
trust is necessary for an efficient legal system or whether it flows from the
moral autonomy of the individual client, lawyers and lawyer codes enshrine
it as the foundation of legal ethics.2 Nowhere is this trust more important
and more abused than when lawyers handle their clients' money.3
Lawyers may be entrusted with their client's funds or funds destined
for third parties. Opposing parties may deposit settlement checks with
lawyers for disbursal or lawyers may ask for a fee advance before beginning
work on a case. In all of these instances, lawyers are acting in a fiduciary
capacity. As such, lawyers must adhere to special standards of prudence,
honesty, and loyalty. This article addresses the special rules that apply
when lawyers handle other people's money.4 After an historical overview,'
this articles explores the four fiduciary duties codified in Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.15.6 The four fiduciary duties are: (1)
segregating client money;7 (2) notifying the client of the receipt of money
or property;8 (3) delivering money or property to the client;9 and (4)
1. Philip F. Dowey, Attorneys' Trust Accounts: The Bar's Role in the Preservation of
Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 292 (1988). "The greatest trust between man and man
is the trust of giving counsel. For in other confidences, men commit the parts of life; their
lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make
their counselors, they commit the whole: by how much the whole they are obligated to all
faith and integrity." Id. (quoting FRANCIS BACON, Of Counsel, in THE WORKS OF LORD
BACON 277 (1846)).
2. State ex. rel Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267 (Okla. 1982). Trust
placed in a lawyer results from the special professional status the lawyer occupies as a
licensed practitioner. Id. Public confidence in the practitioner is essential to the proper
functioning of the profession. Id.
3. In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1154-55 (N.J. 1979) (determining that clients'
willingness to entrust their funds to relative strangers results from centuries of honesty and
faithfulness exhibited by members of the legal profession).
4. A lawyer must also safeguard other property. Kaleidoscope, Inc. v. Powell,
Goldstein, Fraiser & Murphy (In re Kaleidoscope, Inc.), 15 B.R. 232, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729 (N.D. Ga. 1982); People v. Scudder, 590 P.2d
493, 494 (Colo. 1979) (safeguarding lost wills and records); Florida Bar v. 'Carlton, 366 So.
2d 406, 408 (Fla. 1978) (failing to maintain insurance policies in a safe place); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Pollock, 425 A.2d 1352, 1353 (Md. 1981) (misplacing real estate
deeds and recording checks for seven months). To safeguard client documents, lawyers can
maintain safety deposit boxes or files in his office. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHIcS 180 (Practitioner's ed. 1986).
5. See infra notes 16-36.
6. See infra pp. 11-13.
7. See infra notes 53-63.
8. See infra notes 494-98.
9. See infra notes 499-506.
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accounting to the client for the use of the money or property." This article
focuses on the issue of properly segregating client money. It will discuss
the necessity of placing advance fees in the client trust account and
withdrawing amounts as earned." It will also analyze the leading national 2
and Arkansas 3 cases on the ethics of charging nonrefundable fees. Finally,
this article will discuss the newly promulgated requirement that lawyers
maintain an interest-bearing trust account for nominal amounts of client
money held for short periods of time.14 Any interest from this account must
be paid to the Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Foundation. 5
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The American legal profession has always espoused lofty ideals for
lawyers who handle other people's money. Courts have required lawyers
to live up to high fiduciary standards.' 6 At the same time, the courts
claimed an enforcement role. For example, in Stockton v. Ford,7 the United
States Supreme Court provided:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a
higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or,
generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully dis-
charged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed
by sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty
of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit.'"
Similarly, one of the earliest ethics codes described a virtuous lawyer
in these words: "[T]ell me a man is dishonest and I will answer that he is
no lawyer. He cannot be because he is careless and reckless of justice; the
law is not in his heart, is not the standard and rule of his conduct."' 9
The first publication to set out rules for the legal profession may have
been by David Hoffman, a Baltimore practitioner, as part of a course in
10. See infra notes 526-31.
11. See infra notes 64-65.
12. See infra notes 92-127.
13. See infra notes 128-201.
14. See infra notes 467-79.
15. ARKANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(e) (1993) [hereinafter
ARPC].
16. A full discussion of the development of disciplinary systems is beyond the scope
of this article. For an excellent survey of this history, see Mary M. Devlin, The Development
of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911 (1994).
17. Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232 (1850).
18. Id. at 247.
19. Montgomery County Bar Ass'n v. Hecht, 317 A.2d 597, 602 (Penn. 1974) (quoting
D. Webster, Speech to the Charleston Bar, (May 10, 1847)).
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legal study.2" One of Hoffman's fifty resolutions stated: "I will retain no
client's funds beyond the period in which I can, with safety and ease, put
him in possession of them."'" Another resolution condemned commingling:
"I will on no occasion blend with my own, my client's money: if kept
distinctly as his it will be less liable to be considered as my own."22
Hoffman also insisted that honorable lawyers would return any unearned fee
without waiting for the client to inquire about them:
Having received a retainer for contemplated services, which
circumstances have prevented me from rendering, I shall hold
myself bound to refund the same, as having been paid to me on
a consideration which has failed; and, as such, subject to
repetition, on every principle of law, and of good morals,-- and
this shall be repaid not merely at the instance of my client, but
ex mero motu.
23
Pennsylvania Judge George Sharswood, whose ethical prescriptions
greatly influenced the first American Bar Association's ("ABA") ethical
code, wrote that "mutual trust, confidence, and goodwill" are the essence of
the lawyer-client relationship.24 "Money or other trust property coming into
the possession of an lawyer should be promptly reported, and never
commingled with his private property or used by him, except with the
client's knowledge or consent.,
25
Later the American Bar Association would say that a lawyer should
refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses
or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money
of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into
20. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1836). For a discussion of
Hoffman's work, see THOMAS SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION ToPICs 59-166 (1985).
21. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 762.
22. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 762.
23. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 763. In the next resolution, Hoffrnan advises lawyers
to return client's papers when the case is finished even though doing so may be "sometimes
troublesome, and inopportunely, or too urgently made .. " HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at
763.
24. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 85 n. 1 (5th ed. 1896).
25. SHARSWOOD, supra note 24. Alabama adopted most of Sharswood's prescriptions
into the nation's first official code of ethics for lawyers, ALA. CODE OF ETHICS, 118 Ala.
xxiii (1899). The code was first adopted by the Alabama Bar Association in 1887. The first
ABA code, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, was approved in 1908. ABA CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). Relying on the Alabama code extensively, Canon 11,
which deals with client funds, is almost identical to Sharswood's statement cited in the text.
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the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly.
26
Reality, however, has often failed to match the bar's rhetoric. Some
sources indicate that unethical behavior is rampant, at least in some types
of practice.27  More recently, Professor Lisa Lerman found a pattern of
deceptive conduct in: (1) client billing; (2) the type and degree of a
lawyer's expertise; (3) the value of a lawyer's services; and (4) the difficulty
of the lawyer's work for the client.29 Nearly all of the lawyers in Professor
Lerman's survey reported some deception in their billing practices.3" In the
same volume as the Lerman survey, Frederick Miller3 catalogues a parade
of lawyer horribles involving the misappropriation of, and in some cases
theft of, client money.3 2 In 1988, twenty-two percent of all disbarments
related to problems handling client money.3
Even when lawyers are not disbarred for financial misconduct, these
violations often result in other severe sanctions.' Certainly theft of a
client's money will result in the most severe penalty.35 Lawyers who
inadvertently or unintentionally commit violations often receive sanctions
designed to serve an educational or deterrent function.36 Thus, the more a
lawyer knows about these rules and the procedures to ensure compliance
with them, the easier it will be for that lawyer to avoid problems.
26. ABA CANONS OF LEGAL ETHICS Canon 11 (1937).
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 79-80 (citing WOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AMONG
CRIMINAL LAWYERS IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS 70 (1959)).
28. Lerman is Professor of Law at The Catholic University of America, The Columbus
School of Law.
29. Lisa Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659, 665 (1990).
30. Id. at 705.
31. Miller is the executive director and counsel for Client's Security Fund of the State
of New York and a member of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Lawyer's Responsibility for Law Client Protection.
32. Frederick Miller, If You Can't Trust Your Lawyer ... ?, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 785,
786 (1990). Miller recounts the story of a lawyer who induced a client to deposit her life
savings into his trust account and then promptly stole the entire $106,000. Id. All the
lawyer's reimbursement checks bounced. Id. When his practice finally collapsed, claims
from other defrauded clients totaled over $5,000,000. Id. at 788.
33. Id. at 786 n.2. Miller notes that the second largest category of disbarments is
general neglect. Id. See Emily Couric, What Goes Wrong?, 72 A.B.A. J. 65 (1986)
(indicating that 14% of all disbarments and 8% of all suspensions involve mishandling of
client funds). Between 1948 and 1984, more than half of the disbarments in New Jersey
were for mishandling or misappropriating client money. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 177 n.2.
34. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 177 n.2.
35. David E. Johnson & Lucinda Long, Thou Shalt Not Steal, 36 RUTGERS L. 454, 456
(1984).
36. In re Brooks, 494 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Minn. 1993) (requiring a lawyer during his
two-year probation period to maintain accurate business records and demonstrate compliance
to the disciplinary committee).
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III. THE BASIC RULES
A lawyer must treat the property of a client with special care and meet
the highest standards of accountability.37 Even if the professional rules of
ethics did not exist, a lawyer would still be required to act as a fiduciary
toward the client.38 Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary as a "person
on whom the duties of good faith, trust, special confidence, and candor
toward another are imposed., 39 The lawyer's duty regarding client funds
generally arises from agency law principles regarding agents in possession
of property of the principal.4' Thus, a lawyer who receives money or
property for safekeeping acts as a fiduciary in regard to the money or
property."
The law imposes the following duties on all fiduciaries: (1) segregation
of funds and property; (2) notification of receipt of funds or property; (3)
prompt delivery of funds or property; and (4) prompt and accurate
accounting for funds or property.42
A. Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15
These fiduciary duties are codified in Arkansas Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1. 15. The text of the rule reads as follows:
(a) All lawyers shall hold property of clients or third persons
that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representa-
tion separate from the lawyer's own property.
(1) Funds of a client shall be deposited and main-
tained in one or more identifiable trust accounts in
the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or
elsewhere with the consent of the client or third
person. The lawyer or law firm may not deposit
37. E.g., Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 307 A.2d 677, 681 (Md. 1973); In re Grubb, 663 P.2d
1346 (Wash. 1983).
38. In re Deschane, 527 P.2d 683, 684-85 (Wash. 1974). See HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 89-96 (1953); WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 146.
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 381-82 (1957).
41. See LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA 45:101).
42. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, § 1.15:102
(2d ed. 1991).
43. In re Arkansas IOLTA Found., Inc., 885 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1994). The court
originally promulgated the rules at In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 289 Ark. 595, 702 S.W.2d 326
(1985). These rules were based almost entirely on the ABA's MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY which were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in
1983. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MRPC].
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funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm in any
account designated as the trust account, other than
the amount necessary to cover bank charges, or
comply with the minimum balance required for the
waiver of bank charges.
(2) Other property shall be identified as such and
appropriately safeguarded.
(3) Complete records of such account funds and other
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be
preserved for a period of five years after termination
of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or
third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise
permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in posses-
sion of property in which both the lawyer and another person
claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer
until there is an accounting and severance of their interest. If a
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion
in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute
is resolved.
(d) (1) Each trust account referred to in (a) above shall
be an interest-bearing trust account in a bank, savings
bank, trust company, savings and loan association,
savings association, credit union, or federally regu-
lated investment company, and the institution shall be
insured by an agency of the federal government.
(2) A lawyer who receives client funds which in the
judgment of the lawyer are nominal in amount, or are
expected to be held for such a short period of time
that it is not practical to earn and account for income
on individual deposits, shall create and maintain an
interest-bearing account for such funds. The account
shall be maintained in compliance with the following
requirements:
(A) The trust account shall be maintained
in compliance with sections (a), (b) and
1995]
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(c) of this rule and the funds shall be
subject to withdrawal upon request and
without delay;
(B) No earnings from the account shall be
made available to the lawyer or law firm;
and,
(C) The interest accruing on this account,
net of reasonable check and deposit pro-
cessing charges which shall only include
items deposited charge, monthly mainte-
nance fee, per item check charge, and per
deposit charge, shall be paid to the Arkan-
sas IOLTA Foundation, Inc. All other
fees and transaction costs shall be paid by
the lawyer or law firm.
(3) All client funds shall be deposited in the account
specified in section (d)(2) unless they are deposited
in a separate interest-bearing account for a specific
and individual matter for a particular client. There
shall be a separate account opened for each such
particular matter. Interest so earned must be held in
trust as property of each client in the same manner as
is provided in (a) and (b) of this rule.
(4) The interest paid on the account shall not be less
than, nor the fees and charges assessed greater than,
the rate paid or fees and charges assessed, to any
non-lawyer customers on accounts of the same class
within the same institution.
(5) The decision whether to use an account specified
in section (d)(2) or an account specified in section
(d)(3) is within the discretion of the lawyer. In
making this determination, consideration should be
given to the following:
(A) The amount of interest which the
funds would earn during the period they
are expected to be deposited; and,
(B) The cost of establishing and adminis-
tering the account, including the most of
the lawyer's or law firm's services.
(e) All lawyers who maintain accounts provided for in this
Rule, must convert their client trust account(s) to
interest-bearing account(s) with the interest to be paid to the
Arkansas IOLTA Foundation, Inc., no later than six months
from the date of the order adopting this Rule, unless the account
[Vol. 18
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falls within subsection (d)(3). All lawyers shall certify annually
that they, their law firm or professional corporation is in
compliance with all sections and subsections of this Rule.
(f) A lawyer shall certify, in connection with the annual renewal
of the lawyer's license, that the lawyer is complying with all
provisions of this rule. Certification shall be made on the
following form in a manner designated by the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(g) A lawyer or a law firm may be exempt from the require-
ments of this rule if the Arkansas IOLTA Foundation's Board
of Directors, on its own motion, has exempted the lawyer or
law firm from participation in the Program for a period of no
more than two years when service charges on the lawyer's or
law firm's trust account equal or exceed any interest
generated.44
Rule 1.15 is a significant departure from the old code of professional
conduct.45 The old model code required lawyers to keep client funds in a
bank within the state of the lawyer's residence.46 Rule 1.15 does not specify
that funds be kept in a bank and allows the funds to be deposited out-of-
state with the client's permission.' In addition, whereas the old model code
only applied to client funds, not to funds for costs or expenses, Rule 1.15
requires all property of clients and third persons to be deposited.48
Moreover, Rule 1.15 does not make an exception for advances for costs or
expenses and applies all the fiduciary rules to both client and third party
property and funds.49
The most significant innovation is the creation of a comprehensive
IOLTA program. 50 Arkansas lawyers are now required to convert all of
their trust accounts into interest-bearing accounts in which either the client
or the IOLTA foundation will receive the interest payments."' In Arkansas,
lawyers must certify compliance with this rule when paying their annual
Arkansas Supreme Court license renewal fee.52
44. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15. See In re Arkansas IOLTA Found., Inc., 885
S.W.2d at 846.
45. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 1.15 (1980) [hereinafter MCPR].
46. MCPR, supra note 45,
47. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15.
48. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15; MCPR, supra note 45.
49. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(e).
50. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(e).
51. For a discussion of the new IOLTA rules, see infra notes 472-82.
52. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(e).
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IV. THE FIDUCIARY RULES APPLIED
A. Segregation
A lawyer has a duty to keep client funds and property separate from the
lawyer's own funds and property. 3 Courts and disciplinary boards have
required a wide range of funds to be deposited in trust accounts.' The
purpose of the segregation requirement is to protect both the lawyer and the
client. By segregating client money, the lawyer avoids both the appearance
of impropriety and the temptation to use client money for the lawyer's own
purposes. Moreover, segregation eliminates the possibility that the lawyer
will inadvertently use the client's funds. 5 The lawyer must adhere to the
same standard of care as any bank or other financial institution acting in a
fiduciary capacity. 6
The proper way to segregate client funds is through the maintenance of
separate accounts that are clearly identified on behalf of the client. 7 Client
money must be held in an account. The client may not waive the separate
53. Weems v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 685, 523
S.W.2d 900, 907 (1975); Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Engerman, 424 A.2d 362, 368 (Ind.
1981); In re Burr, 228 S.E.2d 678 (S.C. 1976).
54. In re Rogers, 409 P.2d 45, 46 (Ariz. 1965) (holding that judgment awards must be
deposited until delivered to the client); In re Hartman, 401 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (determining that proceeds of a settlement must be deposited in client trust
accounts); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Burger, 401 P.2d 524, 525 (Okla. 1965) (providing that
proceeds from the sale of a client's real or personal property must be deposited in the client
trust account); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Dugger, 385 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1963) (disciplining a
lawyer for failure to account to a client for money received from the sale of a farm deeded
to the lawyer as part of his attorney fee); In re Burr, 228 S.E.2d 678, 680 (S.C. 1976)
(requiring that proceeds from the liquidation of a client's business must be deposited in a
client trust account).
55. See James W. McElhaney, Staying Out of Jail, 79 A.B.A. J. 98 (1993). "It's not
your money. It's not just a technical accounting problem. Your client's money is not your
money, and you've got to keep it separate from your own. It's easy enough to do. All of
your client's money goes in the special trust account. Then no matter how tight your personal
cash flow gets, you never borrow a penny from that trust account. It doesn't matter how valid
your emergency is or how quickly you are going to return it. It's not your money." Id.
56. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42, at 455.
57. E.g., State v. Johnson, 627 P.2d 748, 749 (Colo. 1981). The same principles have
been applied when a lawyer holds funds belonging to third parties. E.g., In re Draper, 317
A.2d 106 (Del. 1974).
If a lawyer's practice does not involve the receipt of client fumds, then no trust account
needs to be created. In re Arkansas IOLTA Found., 885 S.W.2d 846 (Ark. 1994), Petition
at 4 (Appendix). Arkansas also exempts those lawyers who do not practice in Arkansas,
receive clients' funds in Arkansas, or receive funds from Arkansas clients. Id. Full-time
judges, military lawyers, and government lawyers who do not handle client funds are also
exempt. Id. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 621 (1962).
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MONEY
trust account requirement."8 There must be an express agreement for the
lawyer to invest the funds, and any unauthorized investment may lead to
discipline.59 This also applies to money paid to the lawyer by a prospective
client with whom a lawyer-client relationship has not yet been established.' °
Neither practical difficulties nor the nature of the practice warrants
noncompliance with this requirement.6'
Arkansas's new rule requires that lawyers maintain an interest-bearing
trust account for client funds even if they are nominal in amount and are
expected to be held for only a short period of time. The new rule clarifies
what was always implicit: that a lawyer may have a duty to deposit client
funds in several trust accounts. For example, large amounts which will be
held for a considerable time should be deposited in their own interest-
bearing accounts with the interest accruing for the benefit of the client.62
However, lawyers must be prudent. Although the federal deposit insurance
limits apply to each individual with funds deposited in the client trust
account, a lawyer should ascertain if any individual client's funds exceed the
federal deposit insurance limit. If so, the lawyer should consult with the
client to determine how to proceed.63
1. Fees and Retainers
Most jurisdictions require advance fees to be deposited in trust accounts
and to be withdrawn as the fees are earned." The plain language of Rule
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 621 (1962). See also Archer v. State, 548
S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
59. E.g., Cogdill v. First Dist. Comm., 269 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Va. 1980) (prohibiting
loans to third persons from trust account funds).
60. See Mich. Ethics Op. RI-58 (1990).
61. Mich. Ethics Op. RI-93 (1991) (holding that the Legal Aid Society is not exempt
from Rule 1.15 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT in spite of the unique and
practical problems associated with the practice of poverty law).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 70 (1958); ARPC, supra note 15; Roy Conn
III, Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Client Funds, 27 HOW. L. J. 1597, 1608 (1984).
For examples, see ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 250 (2d ed.
1992). See also Frederick Miller, Know Your Rights: The Lawyer's Edition, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J.
71 (1995).
63. Connecticut Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Ops. 92-8, 91-2 (1992 & 1991). The
client may consent to exceed the limits and take the risk of loss. On the other hand, the
lawyer may open separate accounts in several financial institutions, none of which may
exceed the insurance maximum.
64. Accord, Tenn. Ethics Op. 92-F-128(a) (1992); Utah Ethics Op. 118 (1992); Or.
Ethics Op. 1991-88 (1991). See In re Lochow, 469 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1991) (determining
that advance payments for future services must be placed into trust accounts). See generally
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42; Lester Brickman, The Advance Fee Payment Dilemma:
Should Payments be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account,
10 CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 650 n.29 (1989) (favoring the deposit of all advance fees in the
1995]
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1.15 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct suggests that all
advance fees must be placed in the client trust account. In addition, the
rules impose a duty on a lawyer to "refind[ ] any advance payment of fee
that has not been earned."65 Together, these rules imply a duty to segregate
advance fees until earned.
The problem is often deciding when a fee is earned so that the lawyer
may properly place it in the office business account. For example, many
lawyers ask for nonrefundable retainers. The correct place to deposit a
"retainer" fee depends on the sense in which the word is used and the intent
of the lawyer and the client.
a. The Three Definitions of "Retainers"
The traditional, true, or general retainer fee is paid to secure availability
of the lawyer for a given period of time.' This type of retainer fee is
considered to be earned when it is received and must be deposited in the
general office account.67 The lawyer agrees to be available when needed to
represent the particular client in the future. The retainer fee allows the
lawyer to decline other cases in order to be available when called by the
retainer client.68
Lawyers sometimes use the word "retainer" to refer to any advance
payment of fees for services that the lawyer will perform in the future. The
majority rule is that such "retainers" must be deposited in the client trust
account.69
Lawyers sometimes use the word "retainer" to refer to "nonrefundable"
advance fees. In this instance, the lawyer designates the advance fee as a
retainer and, ipso facto, declares it to be nonrefundable. Nevertheless, there
client trust fund). But see In re Stanton, 492 N.E.2d 1056 (Ind. 1986) (holding that although
the lawyer failed to maintain complete records of client funds, the lawyer could not be
charged with this violation because it was not asserted in the complaint).
65. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.16(d). For a discussion of the tax consequences of
holding advance fees see Richard C. Montgomery, Ethical and Legal Issues in Law Firm
Accounting, 64 PA. B.A. Q. 39 (1993) (stating that advance fees deposited in trust accounts
are treated as loans and not subject to income tax until earned, but advance fees placed in
business accounts are treated as income from the time of receipt).
66. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-700(D)(2) (1989);
Va. Ethics Op. 1178 (1993). See generally 1 STUART SPEISER, ATTORNEY'S FEES §§ 1:4, 1:8
(1973) (denoting retainers as both general and special).
67. Baranowski v. State Bar, 593 P.2d 613, 618 (Cal. 1979).
68. The general or true retainer also ensures the lawyer of a minimum cash flow, aids
in personnel planning, and keeps a line of communication open to a potentially important
client. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 506 n.6.
69. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42. See generally Brickman, supra note 64.
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is considerable disagreement about the propriety of such nonrefundable
fees.7" In any event, an advance fee or retainer must be reasonable. "1
Academic commentators have criticized nonrefundable retainers as
unethical and unenforceable. Professors Lester Brickman and Lawrence
Cunningham72 have written a series of influential articles in which they
argue that nonrefundable fees are unethical because they violate established
legal and fiduciary principles." They advance a trust-based theory of the
lawyer-client relationship.74 According to Brickman and Cunningham,
[lawyers] are fiduciaries because the client's retention of an attorney to
exercise professional judgment on his behalf necessarily requires the
client to repose trust and confidence in the attorney. When he exercises
that professional judgment, the lawyer must advance the client's interests
as the client would define them if fully informed. Acting primarily, if not
exclusively, in a client's interest requires undivided loyalty and zealous
devotion. To fulfill these fiduciary duties, lawyers must inspire their
clients' trust and confidence.75
Under this view, the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship
is paramount. Once a client loses faith in the lawyer, the client has an
unqualified right to discharge the lawyer and hire another.76 The discharge
will not be a breach of contract because public policy implies a discharge
right as a provision of every lawyer-client contract.77 Nonrefundable fees
70. Compare In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(nonrefundable fees are unethical per se) and Wis. State Bar Formal Op. e-86-9 (1986)
(nonrefundable fees belong to the attorney when paid).
71. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.5.
72. Lester Brickman and Lawrence Cunningham are law professors at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York City. They have written extensively
on many legal issues including several law review articles on nonrefundable retainers.
Brickman and Cunningham also filed an amicus curiae brief in the Cooperman case. Their
writings have provided much of the legal and intellectual framework for judicial opinions
regarding the ethical validity of nonrefundable retainers.
73. Lester Brickman & Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72
N.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993) [hereinafter Brickman & Cunningham 1993]; Lester Brickman &
Lawrence Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory,
and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (1988) [hereinafter Brickman & Cunningham
1988]. But see Steven Lubet, The Rush to Remedies: Some Conceptual Questions About
Nonrefundable Retainers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 271 (1994). Although Brickman and Cunningham
advance both ethical and contract-based reasons for their position, this article will focus only
on the ethical questions.
74. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 153-157.
75. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 154-155.
76. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 155.
77. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 155-156. See Martin v. Camp,
114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916). It is uncertain how vital the Martin doctrine is in Arkansas.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-304 (Michie 1987), which codifies the minority rule that
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effectively clog the exercise of this right by imposing a financial penalty on
the client who discharges the lawyer.7" Thus, nonrefundable fees are
inconsistent with the fiduciary nature of the lawyer client relationship.
Brickman and Cunningham reject arguments in favor of nonrefundable
fees. First, some proponents of nonrefundable fees argue that nonrefundable
fees pay for the lawyer's assurance of availability in a particular matter.79
Note that this kind of availability is different from the availability that
clients are entitled to wheri they enter into general or true retainers with
their lawyers. With a general retainer, lawyers are available for some
specified period of time for services that may or may not be needed. By
accepting the general retainer, the lawyer agrees to represent the client
whenever the client calls "even if the need for specific services arises at a
time of great inconvenience to the lawyer."' The client gets something for
her money--the lawyer's commitment to perform unspecified legal services
if necessary at some unspecified time in the future. 8' At the same time, the
lawyer is compensated for any expenses or lost income involved in being
"available." However, most lawyers who accept advance fees "rarely turn
down work opportunities because their plates are already full" or "idly await
the moment when their general retainer client demands services." 2 Instead,
they either add the new work on top of the old work or, as in the larger
firms, add more associates.83 Thus, with general retainers, the client gets
nothing in addition to the specified legal services already needed.
Nonrefundable fees should be allowed only when the fee is truly to secure
availability or can be justified by actual additional costs or lost opportuni-
ties.'
Second, some lawyers contend that agreeing to represent a client
precludes a lawyer from representing other parties involved in the matter,
even if the lawyer is discharged by the client. Accordingly, lawyers should
be compensated for this "opportunity loss."8S General retainers do not
invariably lead to conflicts of interest that preclude the lawyer from taking
on other potential clients.86 Even when conflicts do arise, the public need
discharged attorneys may assert a lien based on the contract and are not limited to a quantum
meruit recovery. For a discussion of this question, see infra notes 510-21.
78. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 7.
79. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 22-23 (citing Stephen Gillers, All
Non-Refundable Fee Agreements are Not Created Equal, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1993, at 2).
80. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 23.
81. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 23.
82. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 158.
83. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 159.
84. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 24-25.
85. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 158-59.
86. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 159. This may be more accurate
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for protection outweighs the lawyer's need for financial security.87 Non-
refundable fees create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client
that undermines the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.88 Moreover, the line between proper representation and criminal
liability gets blurred when a lawyer accepts a nonrefundable fee from a
criminal enterprise conducting illegal activities.89
Finally, others argue that retainers are almost never exclusively either
general or special. Instead, they are a mixture of payment for availability
and payment for specified services. It is difficult to put a separate price on
the lawyer's availability as opposed to his services. Any exceptions to a
general ban on nonrefundable fees would only encourage lawyers to
mischaracterize their fees to qualify under the exception. Lawyers would
in metropolitan areas where the pool of potential clients is larger than in small towns and
rural areas. For example, because of the small number of lawyers in rural areas, the
likelihood of a conflict increases. See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT
OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 11 (1990). Moreover, conflicts have a greater
financial impact because of the smaller pool of potential clients. Country lawyers have more
individual clients than city lawyers, but these cases tend to generate less remuneration than
the organizational clients of city lawyers. Id. at 25. The statement in the text may also be
inaccurate in highly technical or specialized subject areas where there are relatively few
lawyers who handle most of the cases. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 158
n.50.
87. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 31-32.
88. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 32. Criminal defense counsel must
represent their clients on appeal until relieved by the court or new counsel. Jones v. State,
318 Ark. 44, 883 S.W.2d 452 (1994); Young v. State, 318 Ark. 235, 236, 884 S.W.2d 591,
592 (1994); and Atkins v. State, 308 Ark. 675, 677, 827 S.W.2d 636, 637 (1992).
ARKANSAS RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 36.26 reads as follows:
RULE 36.26 TRIAL COUNSEL'S DUTIES WITH REGARD TO APPEAL
Trial counsel, whether retained or court appointed, shall continue to represent
a convicted defendant throughout any appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court,
unless permitted by the trial court or the Arkansas Supreme Court to withdraw
in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause.
ARKANSAS RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 36.26.
Sometimes this means that the lawyer will continue to work on a case even though the
client can not compensate him. Some lawyers argue that nonrefundable retainers in criminal
cases should be allowed to offset the losses lawyers incur in these situations. Nevertheless,
nonrefundable retainers cannot be justified. The essence of this argument is that lawyers
should be allowed to overcharge some clients in criminal cases to make up for other, less
lucrative cases. Although this is the policy behind contingent fees, such fees have never been
allowed in criminal cases because of the severe consequences of the case to the defendant.
In addition, lawyers cannot charge excessive or unreasonable fees to any client. It would
pervert the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship to allow lawyers to sustain their
income at the expense of their clients. Cf Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at
36.
89. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 33. See generally Eugene R.
Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1165
(1992).
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"characterize their fee arrangements in whatever way is necessary to enable
them to keep the advance fee .... " The exception would thus swallow the
rule.9
b. The Coopernan Case
In re Cooperman92 was the first judicial decision to invalidate a non-
refundable retainer on the ground that it was unethical.93 Cooperman was
a lawyer charged with fifteen violations centering around his use of
nonrefundable retainer agreements.94 The grievance committee had
previously disciplined him on two occasions for using nonrefundable retainer
agreements. 95  Nevertheless, Cooperman continued to use the same
nonrefundable fee agreements which led to his discipline.96 Three specific
fee agreements were at issue.97 In the first case, Cooperman agreed to
represent a client in a criminal case and charged a nonrefundable $10,000
retainer.9" After Cooperman made one court appearance in which he
unsuccessfully tried to withdraw the client's previous guilty plea, he was
discharged by the client.99 Of course, Cooperman claimed the entire
$10,000 and the client filed a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary
committee." The other two incidents followed a similar pattern. "
The New York Supreme Court held that the use of a nonrefundable fee
retainer violated the lawyer's obligation to refund unearned fees upon
discharge. 2 The court distinguished minimum fee agreements as predic-
tions of the amount the client can expect to pay from those agreements in
which the lawyer is paid based on quantum meruit if he is discharged.'0 3
90. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 26.
91. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 26-27.
92. In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
93. Cf Federal Says. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Angell, Holmes, & Lea, 838 F.2d 395 (9th
Cir. 1988) (stating that the law firm was not entitled to retain an advance fee deposit after
being discharged even though the fees were denominated as "earned upon payment").
Although a few courts had considered nonrefundable fees prior to the Cooperman decision,
their analysis was superficial and their conclusions ambiguous. For a collection of these cases
see Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 150.
94. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
95. Id. at 859.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 857.
99. Id. at 858.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Although a New York ethics opinion" previously approved a "minimum
fee agreement" as a sub-species of a nonrefundable fee agreement, the
Cooperman court refused to "blur the valid distinction" between the two.105
The court was unequivocal:
Since an attorney's fee is never truly nonrefundable until it is earned, the
use of this term, which by definition allows an attorney to keep an
advance payment irrespective of whether the services contemplated are
rendered, is misleading, interferes with a client's right to discharge an
attorney, and attempts to limit an attorney's duty to refund promptly,
upon discharge, all those fees not yet earned."°
The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed the Cooperman
ruling. 7 The court held that the use of nonrefundable fee retainers violated
public policy by compromising the client's right to discharge the lawyer at
any time." The court noted that the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client
relationship imposed a number of "special and unique duties," including
maintaining confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, operating
competently, safeguarding client property, and honoring the clients' interests
over the lawyer's interests.' 9 This meant that fee agreements are governed
by principles that are different from ones that apply to "commonplace
commercial contracts."" 0 Thus, the client's "unqualified right to terminate"
the lawyer-client relationship assumed prominence."' Although the
discharged lawyer must refund any unearned portion of a fee, the lawyer
may still recover in quantum meruit for the services actually performed." 2
Nonrefundable retainers "diminish the core of the fiduciary relationship" by
chilling the client's discharge right.' By penalizing the client's exercise of
the discharge right, the client is coerced to remain in a fiduciary relation-
104. N.Y. Bar Ass'n Op. 599 (1989).
105. Id.
106. Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
107. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994).
108. Id. at 1072. See generally Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that
the lawyer-client contract has unique features and, therefore, the client may terminate the
contract with or without cause). The court used the "special retainer" to refer to a fee
arrangement where the client pays in advance for services to be rendered in the future.
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1074. The court used the phrase "general retainer" to refer to
what this article calls "true" retainers -- payments for availability to render potential but
unspecified services in the future. Id.
109. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1071. See Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note
61, at 6.
110. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113.. Id.
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ship, something the court referred to as an "utter anomaly.. 1. 4 The court
condemned nonrefundable retainers: "This would be a shameful, not
honorable, professional denouement.""1 5
The New York Court of Appeals also rejected Cooperman's invitation
to evaluate nonrefundable fees under a "reasonableness" or "clearly
excessive" standard, determining that the client's right to discharge a lawyer
and the right not to be charged excessive fees are separate and distinct
aspects of the lawyer client relationship.16 Moreover, any attempt to charge
a nonfundable fee conflicts with the rules that require a lawyer to return all
unearned fees." 7 Thus, in addition to violating the client's discharge right,
nonrefundable fees deprive the client of his right to a refund of any
unearned fees. 1 '
The court noted that the opinion dealt only with the return of fees
advanced by the client but not earned by the lawyer."9 Other fee arrange-
ments that do not burden the client's discharge right nor deprive the client
of the return of unearned fees will still be proper. 2° These include
"minimum fee arrangements and general retainers, not laden with the
nonrefundability impediment irrespective of any services..' 121
The Coopennan decisions represent a victory for Professors Brickman
and Cunningham. These two cases adopt their position that the client's right
to discharge a lawyer takes precedence over the lawyer's economic interests.
As such, Brickman and Cunningham indicate that the central feature of fee
regulation is the protection of the client which flows naturally from the
fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship. However, nonrefundable
fees undermine the specific lawyer-client relationship as well as the public's
trust in the legal system. "Because the attorney-client relationship is
recognized as so special and so sensitive in our society, its effectiveness,
actually and perceptually, may be irreparably impaired by conduct which
undermines the confidence of the particular client or the public in
114. Id. at 1073.
115. Id.
116. Id. New York bases its ethical requirements on the ABA's MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. However, the Disciplinary Rules and the ABA's MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT are identical with regard to fee agreements,
notwithstanding the differences in terminology.
117. Id. See, e.g., Matthew v. State Bar, 781 P.2d 952, 953 (Cal. 1989).
118. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1073.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. In New York, "minimum fees" are forecasts of the least amount the client can
expect to spend if the lawyer performs the specified services. N.Y. Ethics Op. 599, 1989 WL
252368 at *1 (N.Y. Bar Ass'n Comm. Professional Ethics March 16, 1989).
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general."' 22  Professor Brickman candidly stated, "Look, everybody in
society would love to get paid in advance and get to keep the money, even
if they don't do any work. Lawyers would be the only ones who would get
to do that, if the [Cooperman] court had decided it was ethical."'23
The Cooperman decisions do not involve "true retainers," where the
client pays for the lawyer's future availability. 2 4  Brickman and
Cunningham have proposed a rule that, among other things, creates a
rebuttable presumption that any advance fees are refundable.'25 According
to the rule, the lawyer would bear the burden to show that any advance fee
122. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072.
123. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 17 n.65.
124. Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d at 1072.
125. The text of the proposed rule is:
Nonrefundable Retainers Prohibited, Advance Fees Deposited to Client Trust Account.
When a client (or any other person on behalf of a client) pays a lawyer or law
firm any sum of money or delivers any other property as payment in advance
for specified services to be rendered in a specified matter, no such money or
property shall be or become the property of the lawyer or law firm until such
time, if any, as it shall have been earned through the rendering of such services.
All such money and property shall be deposited by the lawyer or law firm
promptly upon receipt into a separate trust account mandated in this jurisdiction
for the receipt of client property, and shall be withdrawn only when such
portions of it shall have been earned through the rendering of such services.
The lawyer or law firm shall promptly refund any unearned money or property
to the client upon the conclusion of the representation. Any effort, by contract
or otherwise, to contravene this Rule shall be null, void, and unenforceable, and
lawyers or law firms involved in making any such effort shall have violated this
Rule.
Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 17 n.65.
This rule addresses fees paid by or on behalf of a client to a lawyer or law firm in
advance for legal services, and its purpose is to protect the client's discharge right. See
Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916). This rule prohibits any attempt by a lawyer or
law firm to retain any such advance fee payment if the services are not rendered, whether
because of discharge, withdrawal, or otherwise, and whether dominated as a nonrefundable
fee, a minimum fee, a general retainer, or otherwise. See In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d
855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
The phrase "specified services to be provided in a specified matter" denotes a "special
retainer" agreement. Special retainer agreements are to be distinguished from "general
retainer" agreements. General retainer agreements are narrowly tailored agreements
providing exclusively for a lawyer or law firm to be available to render services over a
specified period of time. See Greenbert v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 129 N.E. 211 (N.Y.
1920). Special retainer agreements provide for the performance of specific legal services for
a fee, which may be fixed, contingent, a percentage, or computed on an hourly basis.
Because the distinction between general retainer agreements and special retainer agreements
is sometimes difficult to draw and in order to protect the interests of clients, all retainer
agreements are rebuttably presumed to be special retainer agreements and covered by this
rule. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 39-40.
For a critique of the Brickman and Cunningham position, see Lubet, supra note 73,
at 271.
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is a general or true retainer.26 Thus, an increasing number of courts have
adopted Brickman's and Cunningham's conclusion that nonrefundable fees
violate the rules of ethics or violate contract principles.'27
c. Nonrefundable Fees in Arkansas: The Arens Case
The Arkansas Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in a case
involving a nonrefundable fee. In Aiens v. Committee on Professional
Conduct, 28 the supreme court sanctioned two lawyers who did not refund
the unearned portion of a "nonrefundable" fee.
The clients, facing the foreclosure of their farm within weeks, sought
the services of Lawyer Arens. 129 Although the clients already had a lawyer
in Kansas, the clients wanted Arens because of his reputation for handling
agricultural loan cases. 3 ' The clients believed that the Arens firm would
attempt to restructure their debt and then pursue lender liability actions. 3 '
The clients paid the lawyer a $60,000 "retainer" to handle the case and the
contract denominated the fee as "nonrefundable." The clients also agreed
to pay an additional forty percent contingency fee. 3
2
The lawyers obtained a temporary restraining order to stay the
foreclosure sale, but the order was never made permanent. 33 The Arens firm
spent very little time on these matters.' 4 Thereafter, the clients lost their
land in the foreclosure sale. The clients then began to have difficulty
contacting Arens, and the case was assigned to another lawyer in the firm.'35
126. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 39.
127. AFLAC v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. 1994); Cohen v Radio-Elecs.
Officers Union, 645 A.2d 1248, 1250 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994); In re Cooperman, 633
N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994); Brandes v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (N.Y. 1991).
128. Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 307 Ark. 308, 820 S.W.2d 263
(1991).
129. Id. at 309, 820 S.W.2d at 263.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 310, 820 S.W.2d at 264. The court opinion notes that the contract of
employment recited that the clients hired Arens to "represent us [them] in a lawsuit (if
necessary) with the Farm Credit System to enforce our [their] rights under the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987 and to obtain damages caused by the Farm Credit System." Id.
132. Id. at 310, 820 S.W.2d at 264. The agreement stated:
It is our understanding that if any recovery is made over and above debt
restructure or reduction, that our expenses, including the above retainer, and
your firm's out-of-pocket expenses will be paid. Only thereafter will any net
recovery be shared on a sixty percent (60%) to us and forty percent (40%) to
your firm basis.
Id.
133. Id. at 311, 820 S.W.2d at 264.
134. Id. at 311, 820 S.W.2d at 264-65.
135. Id.
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Eight months after they were hired, the Arens firm filed a lender liability
action on behalf of the clients in federal district court. 36 This action, which
included several state claims submitted under the pendent jurisdiction of the
federal court, was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.'37
Six months later, the clients met with Arens and two other lawyers. 3 '
The clients decided not to appeal the district court ruling but to wait to see
if Congress amended the statute in order to provide a private right of
action.'39 When the statute was not amended, the clients decided to file an
action within three months in state court based on the state claims. 4 0 The
clients received assurances that the law firm's principals would be involved
in this litigation. 4' One of the principals of the law firm, Alexander, stated
that little additional work needed to be done because the state claims had
previously been included in the dismissed federal case.'42
Once again, the clients had trouble contacting their lawyers.'43 The
clients called several times, but never received a return call.'" Eleven
months after the state action was to be filed, the client sent a letter to
Alexander requesting a meeting to discuss the progress of the case."'
Again, the clients did not receive a reply.'" Finally, almost thirteen months
after the state court complaint should have been filed and almost twenty-
seven months after hiring the law firm, the clients went to Lawyer Arens'
office to confront him about the lack of action in the case."' During this
meeting, Arens had difficulty finding the clients' case file. 4s Arens claimed
that another lawyer named Lindzey had the file and "[h]e hasn't done a
thing on it, and I'm going to fire that man."' 49 The clients stated that they
no longer had confidence in the lawyers.' Arens replied that "[y]ou don't
have any money coming, and if you think you do have any money coming,
136. Id.
137. Id. at 311-12, 820 S.W.2d at 265.
138. Id. at 312, 820 S.W.2d at 265.
139. Id. The clients understood that the Arens firm had contacts in Washington who
would amend the statute in their favor. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 313, 820 S.W.2d at 265.
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you're going to have to hassle me for it."'' Subsequently, the clients
informed a secretary in the firm that they wanted an accounting and their
case files.' Thereafter, the clients sent a letter to the firm requesting the
same. 
53
Approximately one month later, the Arens' firm sent the clients a
letter."5 In the letter, they promised to provide an accounting and enclosed
a copy of a complaint that was to be filed in state court. 55 The complaint
was almost a replication of the complaint filed in federal court.'56 The
caption had been changed but the references to federal law remained.'57
Once again, the clients wrote to the law firm requesting an accounting and
the return of the case files. 5 Two months after the law firm's letter, they
filed an ethics complaint.'59 Five weeks later, the law firm provided an
accounting which indicated that twelve different lawyers worked a total of
1,133.25 hours on the case."' ° The accounting indicated that one lawyer
worked 200 hours on the federal court complaint and an additional 300 to
400 hours on the state complaint.'
6
'
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the fee was unreasonable under
Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 62 The court noted
that the amount of the fee is only one factor in determining its reasonable-
ness. 163 Initially, the $60,000 fee was not unreasonable in relation to the
amount in controversy, the nature of the litigation, and the seriousness of the
consequences to the clients."6 Because the firm did not perform the
promised services, the court upheld the committee's finding that the fees
were not commensurate with the circumstances. 65 The court noted:
If a lawyer charges a reasonable retainer and is retained for the
purpose of providing specified services, but never perforns those
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 313, 820 S.W.2d at 266.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 314, 820 S.W.2d at 266.
159. Id.
160. Id. The firm admitted that they did not keep regular work records. Id. They only
kept sufficient documentation to track how the firm was allocating its resources. Id.
161. Id. It should be noted that the supreme court opinion places quotation marks around
the word accounting, thus indicating the court's skepticism about its accuracy.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 314-15, 820 S.W.2d at 266.
164. Id. at 314, 820 S.W.2d at 266.
165. Id.
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services, the fee charged would become unreasonable. Just as a lawyer
cannot bill a client for work never performed in the past, a lawyer cannot
bill a client for work he will never perform in the future. 166
In addition, the court affirmed the committee's finding that by failing
to surrender the clients' papers and property, the lawyer failed to take steps
to protect the clients' interest upon termination of the representation.'67 The
Arkansas Supreme Court did not go as far as Cooperman, which held that
nonrefundable fees are per se unethical. 6 The Cooperman decision was
based on the unqualified right of the client to discharge the lawyer.169 This
right would be significantly encumbered if the client could not recover an
advance fee paid but not earned. 7 Nonetheless, the Arens decision does not
rest on these concerns. 7 ' Instead, the Arens court focused on the reason-
ableness of the fee.'72 Here the amount of the fee was reasonable at the
beginning of the case, but became unreasonable when the law firm refused
to return the unearned fees to the clients following their discharge.
In Arens, the court found that the amount of the fee became unreason-
able in light of the work performed (or, perhaps more accurately, not
performed). This reasoning is consistent with several recent decisions from
other jurisdictions.'73 Even though these courts did not find nonrefundable
fees unethical per se, they made strong statements against nonrefundable
fees.'74 If a fee becomes unreasonable in light of the work promised but
never performed, then few fees will ever be truly nonrefundable' 75 Like the
proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, there seems to be an
implicit presumption that an advance payment is not a "true retainer." In
166. Id. at 311, 820 S.W.2d at 264.
167. Id. at 315, 820 S.W.2d at 264. The Arens firm may also have violated Rules 1.3
(pertaining to diligence of a lawyer) and 1.4 (regarding communications with client) of the
ARKANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. ARPC, supra note 15, Rules 1.3 & 1.4.
168. In re Cooperman, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855, 856 (N.Y. Div. 1993).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 307 Ark. 308, 310, 820 S.W.2d 263,
264 (1991).
172. Id.
173. In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136 (Or. 1993) (holding a nonrefundable fee unreasonable
when a lawyer failed to do the promised work). See Or. Ethics Op. 136 (1994); LAWYERS'
MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 249 (1993) (providing that a fee agreement should
specify what portion of the fee is nonrefundable, that a lawyer may not default in
performance, and under what circumstances a portion of the "nonrefundable" fee may be
refunded); Cf Bain v. Weiffenbach, 590 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
nonrefundable fees must be judged by standards of reasonableness and not by reference to
nonrefundability alone).
174. Arens, 307 Ark. at 311, 820 S.W.2d at 264.
175. Brickman & Cunningham 1988, supra note 73, at 190.
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such cases, the lawyer will bear the burden of showing that the client agreed
to a true retainer arrangement and that the amount of the retainer is
reasonable.176 Thus, the lawyer must show that the work performed was
sufficient to justify the amount of the advance fee.
Arguably, the Arens decision accomplishes the same result as
Cooperman. The Arens court clearly stated that lawyers cannot charge for
services they do not perform.' The court indicated that the lawyer has an
obligation to return at least the unearned portion of the fee if the lawyer is
discharged before the case is completed.' There is no room for semantics:
the lawyer must earn the fee charged.
In a reply to Professors Brickman and Cunningham, Professor Steven
Lubet advances a position similar to that reached in Arens.'79 Lubet
suggests that although nonrefundable fees are suspect to abuse, a blanket
prohibition of them goes too far. 80  Brickman's and Cunningham's
paradigm case involves the overreaching lawyer and the vulnerable,
unsophisticated client. Such a scenario undermines client autonomy.'
Many clients may be capable of negotiating a fair and reasonable
nonrefundable fee arrangement. 2 Lubet points out:
Brickman and Cunningham give little weight to the possibility that
a nonrefundable retainer might be the product of rational negotiation
between attorney and client. Likewise, the Cooperman court declared
nonrefundable retainers flatly unethical thereby placing them beyond the
pale of legitimate agreement. They may be right. Perhaps nonrefundable
retainers are so unconscionable that no sane client would ever consent to
one. That position, however, cannot be made convincing without taking
greater account of client autonomy, acumen, and intelligence.
8 3
Finally, Lubet argues that the right to discharge a lawyer is never
completely unfettered."8 Whenever a client has invested significant funds
in a case, there will be some degree of economic pressure on the client not
176. For a discussion of the factors establishing a true retainer, see supra text
accompanying note 225.
177. Arens, 307 Ark. at 311, 820 S.W.2d at 264.
178. Id.
179. Lubet, supra note 73, at 284.
180. Lubet, supra note 73, at 284.
181. Lubet, supra note 73, at 274.
182. Lubet, supra note 73, at 274.
183. Lubet, supra note 73, at 275. Lubet raises the issue of client autonomy again in
critiquing the non-waivability of Brickman's and Cunningham's absolute prohibition. Lubet,
supra note 73, at 277-78.
184. Lubet, supra note 73, at 284.
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to terminate the lawyer who has conducted the work.'85 Thus, the client's
right to discharge a lawyer should not be expanded into a blanket ban on
nonrefundable fees until the economics of representation are understood.'86
In the end, Lubet suggests that the existing principles against excessive fees
and the requirement to return unearned fees may be sufficient to discipline
and deter lawyers who use nonrefundable fees to "gouge, cheat, or otherwise
exploit their clients."' 87
The Arens'88 case provides support for Professor Lubet's position. The
clients were sophisticated and understood the nature of the lender liability
litigation. 9 They negotiated the fee agreement and monitored Arens'
progress on the case. 9° When the clients lost faith in Arens, the clients
fired him, hired new counsel, and filed an ethics complaint. 9 ' Ultimately,
the prohibition against excessive fees and the requirement that unearned fees
be returned provided the basis for Arens' discipline.'92 Nevertheless, it is
unfortunate that the Arkansas Supreme Court did not take this opportunity
to declare nonrefundable fees unethical per se.
Using the reasonableness or clearly excessive standard does not
adequately protect the client's interests and allows lawyers to engage in
what amounts to misrepresentation. First, nonrefundable fees are ubiquitous
in family cases, criminal defense, and bankruptcies.' 93 In each of these
areas, clients may be more vulnerable and less sophisticated than in other
areas of the law.'94 These clients need the lawyer to be a true fiduciary--
someone who will not abuse their trust even if the lawyer could deceive the
client. Nevertheless, Arens allows lawyers to denominate their fees as non-
refundable. Clients, who probably have not read the advance sheets of the
Arkansas Reports, will be unaware that "nonrefundable" fees are really
185. Lubet, supra note 73, at 284. But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 481-82 (1977)
(holding that a right is not impinged upon merely because that right is made more costly as
long as it can be freely exercised).
186. Lubet, supra note 73, at 284.
187. Lubet, supra note 73, at 274.
188. Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 307 Ark. 308, 820 S.W.2d 263
(1991).
189. Id. at 309, 820 S.W.2d 263.
190. Id. at 312-13, 820 S.W.2d at 265.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 314, 820 S.W.2d at 266.
193. Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer
Agreements in Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REV. 1037, 1068
(1992).
194. Brickman & Cunningham 1993, supra note 73, at 12 (providing that clients are
vulnerable because of their impaired emotional and financial ability to investigate the prices
of different lawyers).
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refundable because the lawyer must give back any unearned portion. 95 If
a lawyer abuses this trust and fails to return the correct portion of the
advance fee, clients may not complain or may be deterred by the lawyer's
false explanation that the fee is nonrefundable. In the end, only those
clients sophisticated enough to complain to the appropriate disciplinary
committee may receive their proper refund. Moreover, complaining to the
disciplinary committee may not result in the return of the client's money.
Although the committee may condition reinstatement upon the return of
unearned fees, it has little authority to monitor whether the lawyer refunds
the money to the client. Unlike a court judgment, the committee's order
cannot be used as a basis to seize the offending lawyer's property. Even if
the order provides a basis for the client to recover money from the client
security fund, the amounts may not cover the client's loss. This was true
in the Arens case because the amount of the fee far exceeded the recovery
ceiling. Although a blanket prohibition does not guarantee repayment, it
more strongly deters dishonest lawyers from taking such fees and more
effectively prevents honest lawyers from inadvertently spending an advance
fee. In the former case, the dishonest lawyer will have a difficult time
disguising the nature of the fee, while in the latter case the lawyer will
always have money remaining in the client trust account to reimburse
clients.
Using the reasonableness standard also fails to provide guidance to
lawyers who receive advance fees. First, the Arens case did not involve a
"true" retainer. Presumably, a true retainer complies with Rules 15 and 1.5
of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct to the extent that it can be
considered earned when received. 96 The true retainer pays for the
availability of the lawyer and is earned when received, but this is not quite
as simple as it seems.97 It is unclear what a reasonable price might be for
a lawyer's availability. It should not be the same as the total fee because
the total fee includes both availability and specific services. Moreover, the
fee should have some connection to the costs the lawyer incurs for being
available. That line, however, is indistinct.' 98
195. Brickman, supra note 64, at 654-75.
196. ARPC, supra note 15, Rules 1.5 & 1.15.
197. ARPC, supra note 15, Rules 1.5 & 1.15.
198. For a catalogue of factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of
general retainers, see Mich. Ethics Op. R-10 (1990) (assessing the following factors: the
complexity of the case; the likelihood of preclusion from the lawyer's other work; whether
the agreement is in writing; the intelligence, maturity, and sophistication of the client; and
whether or not the lawyer actually incurs some expenses). For a list of the factors that go
into an assessment of minimum fees, see N.Y. Ethics Op. 1991-3, 1991 WL 639877 *3 (N.Y.
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional & Judicial Ethics, May 16, 1991).
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Using the reasonableness standard also provides no guidance to the
lawyer regarding where the advance fee should be deposited. If the fee is
not the lawyer's until earned, the fee must be deposited in the client trust
account.199 But there is a logical inconsistency in claiming that a fee
reasonable in its inception becomes unreasonable when the lawyer will not
refund a portion of it. Most problems with trust accounts arise in situations
where the lawyer cannot avoid the temptation to borrow client money.
Thus, lawyers feeling financial pressure, suffering from substance abuse, or
simply acting sloppily in maintaining their business records often convert
client funds. Telling these lawyers that they may now deposit
"nonrefundable" fees in their accounts only increases the chance that the
money will not be available when a client demands the return of an
unearned fee. The lawyer may then have to borrow other clients' funds to
meet his current obligations. Eventually, the spiral leads to conversion
without hope of reimbursement and then to disbarment. One commentator
described the process in this way:
So there you are. The money is in your general account, yet you haven't
done the work. You are likely to spend the money before you ever do
the work. It is just like using credit cards to live beyond your means.
Soon you have spent much more than you can ever pay--or at least
comfortably pay. Using non-refundable fees can tempt you to take on
clients for the wrong reasons. For example, accepting the case means
that you will have immediate cash. This opportunity to pay your
overhead or yourself is likely to color your decision to accept new
clients, even though you are already unable to meet obligations to other
clients. Soon you have spent the money from the new client, without
doing the work, and you accept more fees from another client because
you again are in need of cash. Your motivation to do work at all wanes,
because you don't have to do the work first in order to get paid. There
you are sliding down the slippery slope toward ethics and legal
malpractice complaints, including charges that your fees were excessive
and complaints that you failed to represent your client properly. Why
tempt fate? Instead, reduce your exposure to claims by requiring a
retainer fee up front, without making it non-refundable. This arrange-
ment lets you hold the client's money in trust until you do the work. In
this way you gain all the advantages of the non-refundable fee, with none
of the dangers. 200
199. Some jurisdictions have held that advance fees may be deposited in the lawyer's
business account but the lawyer still has an obligation to return any unearned portion of the
fee upon discharge. This suggestion invites problems for the lawyer and the bar.
200. Barbara S. Fishleder, Why Tempt Fate?, 54 OR. ST. B. BULL. 33 (May 1994).
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In sum, the reasonableness of a fee is always an issue. That is, all fees,
no matter what they are called, must be commensurate to the service
provided. Analyzing the nonrefundable fee under this general standard adds
nothing in the way of client protection or lawyer guidance. Because the
Arens20' decision makes almost all fees subject to refund upon discharge,
lawyers would be well advised not to read Arens as an invitation to use
"reasonable" nonrefundable fees.
d. State Ethics Opinions
The most comprehensive ethical opinion on the issue came in Michigan
Ethics Opinion RI-69. Lawyers were advised that according to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15, a lawyer's property has to be
segregated from the property connected with the representation of the client
or third person.20 2 The lawyer has to place all funds the client paid to the
lawyer, or firm, other than advances for costs or expenses, in an interest-
bearing trust account maintained in the state in which the law office is
situated.20 3 No funds belonging to the lawyer or firm are to be deposited
in that account.2" Additionally, the lawyer is responsible for maintaining
complete records of those account funds and of other property kept by the
lawyer, and the record must be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.2 5
A lawyer can charge a flat or fixed fee for services rendered to a client,
and nonrefundable fees can also be flat or fixed under the proper circum-
stances.2°6 Unearned retainer fees have to be deposited in the firm's client
trust account.20 7 Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.15(a) advances for costs or expenses are exempt from deposit in the trust
account. However, deposits of unearned lawyer fees are not exempt because
a lawyer cannot withdraw "anticipated fees."2 8 The lawyer has to explain
to the client that the retainer is considered a deposit, inform the client that
201. Arens, 307 Ark. at 308, 820 S.W.2d at 263.
202. Mich. Ethics Op. RI-69, 1991 WL 519888, at *1 (Mich. Standing Comm. on
Professional & Judicial Ethics Feb. 14, 1991) (quoting MRPC, supra note 45, Rule 1.15(a)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Mich. Ethics Op. RI-10 (1989); Mich. Ethics Op. RI-50 (1990)).
207. Id. (citing Mich. Ethics Op. RI-7 (1989)).
208. Id.
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withdrawals will be made for fees, and advise the client that no withdrawals
will be for more than the amount of the bill.2 9
A nonrefundable retainer can be deposited directly into the firm's
operating account.210 If any portion of the retainer is unearned because it is
paid in advance for future legal services based on an hourly, flat, or
percentage basis, it is not a nonrefundable retainer.2 ' The committee
recognized that semantics play a part in determining how funds are
handled.2"2 If the money is labeled as "nonrefundable," then it does not
have to be deposited in a trust account.2"3 This is because nonrefundable
retainers are nonrefundable and are earned at the time of receipt.2"4
However, the retainer has to be proportional to its intended purpose; it
cannot be excessive in relation to the purpose for the retainer.1 5 "Flat or
fixed fee" funds that are charged in advance with no agreement between the
client and the lawyer as to refundability because they are for future services
are unearned and have to be placed in the client trust account2"6 Therefore,
these funds must remain in the client trust account until the lawyer performs
the services to which the client is entitled.21 7
If the lawyer is paid on an hourly basis and has a retainer, the lawyer
can withdraw the fee from the trust account as the agreed services are
performed.2"' Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 imposes
certain requirements relating to client communications and client consent for
fees.219 A lawyer and client are not prohibited from agreeing that a portion
of the fixed fee will be deemed "earned" by the lawyer.' Thus, the lawyer
would be entitled to withdraw that particular portion of the fee at certain
times or for certain events.2 ' Both parties can agree on designating when
the fees are to be earned or what events constitute fees being earned, such
as the completion of certain tasks or any other basis to which the parties
mutually agree.222 However, a lawyer cannot enter into an agreement for,
209. Id.
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Filing a plea might constitute earning a portion of the fee. Id.
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charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.223 The fee is excessive
when "a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." '224
The Michigan opinion noted that in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.5(a), there are factors to consider in determining if a fee is
reasonable: the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill needed to perform the legal services
properly; the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the lawyer will be
precluded from accepting any other employment if that particular employ-
ment is accepted; the fee is similar to the fee customarily charged for similar
services in the locality; the amount involved and results obtained; the time
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; the experience,
reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
whether the fee is fixed or contingent.225 If the lawyer does not regularly
represent the client, the rate of the fee must be communicated to the client,
preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after representation
commences.
226
Even with a fixed fee, if the representation is interrupted before all the
services have been rendered, the client is entitled to a partial refund of the
advanced fee.227 If the contract does not state when the lawyer has "earned"
portions of the fixed advance fee, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5(a) will be applicable in determining what amount the client will be
refunded. 22" The Michigan opinion also noted that when the contract states
the terms agreed to by the lawyer and client regarding performance of
services under a fixed fee agreement, it assists the lawyer in determining
when fees are "earned" and provides a basis for calculating any refund the
client may be entitled to if the representation is interrupted.229 If the
contract does not state which portions of the fixed or flat fee are earned, the
lawyer is required to complete all contracted services before being able to
withdraw any amount of an advanced flat or fixed fee from the client trust
account for the lawyer's personal use.23
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing MRPC, supra note 43, Rule 1.5(a)).
225. Id. at *3. See MRPC, supra note 43, DR 2-106 (1980).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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e. Other Significant Cases
The issue in Wright v. Arnold"' was whether a nonrefundable retainer
fee based on an hourly rate for legal services could be retained regardless
of whether the lawyer rendered the contemplated services. The court only
dealt with the nonrefundable retainer fee in an hourly contract and
specifically stated that it did not address the issue regarding a contingency
fee contract or a fixed-rate contract.232
In Wright, the client hired the lawyer to collect back child support
payments.233 The client signed a document agreeing to pay a $4000 non-
refundable retainer for whatever services were rendered.234 The client also
agreed to pay $100 per hour for in-office time and $125 for in-court time. 5
The client claimed she did not know that the retainer was nonrefundable
because she did not read the contract before signing it.23 6 Within thirteen
days after signing the contract, the client fired the lawyer.237
The court held that a nonrefundable retainer fee puts impermissible
restraints on the client's right to discharge the lawyer.238 The relationship
involves trust, reliance, and confidence, and when any part of the relation-
ship is destroyed, the client has the absolute right to discharge the lawyer.239
The court stated that the Oklahoma Code of Professional Conduct provided
that when a lawyer is terminated, the lawyer has to refund any advance fee
payment that has not been earned.240 A contract between the lawyer and
client for a certain fee would not be upheld or enforced when the fee is so
excessive that it shows the lawyer is trying to take advantage of the client.241
The lawyer argued that he had to rearrange his schedule and set aside
other previously scheduled work, that the fee covered actual hours spent and
expenses incurred, and that he had to forego other potential employment.242
The court said that these factors are only relevant to the issue of whether the
fee was reasonable based upon the services rendered, but these factors were
not relevant to the issue of whether the nonrefundable retainer was
231. Wright v. Arnold, 877 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
232. Id. at 619.
233. Id. at 617.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 618.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting White v. American Law Book Co., 233 P. 426, 427 (Okla. 1924)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 619.
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enforceable.24 3 The court determined that the client is liable to the lawyer
under a theory of quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services
performed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the
reasonable value of the lawyer's services. 2'
California recently dealt with nonrefundable fees in In re Fonte.24
Lawyer Fonte argued that he did not have to account for the fee advanced
in a case because it was a retainer and was earned upon receipt.246 He
further asserted that Disciplinary Rule 4-100(B)(3) did not contain the word
"fees," and therefore, fees are not included in the rule's accounting
requirement.247 Thus, he argued that the rule only applies to funds received
from the client and placed in a trust account or property received from the
client or a third party for the client.2 48 The court disagreed and stated that
the rule requires a lawyer to maintain records and account for "all funds,
securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the
lawyer or law firm. 249 The court also stated that a true retainer fee is a fee
paid solely to guarantee the availability of the lawyer for a period of time
and it is earned upon receipt, regardless of whether the lawyer actually
performs any services for the client.250 The court further provided that the
clients were paying for more than availability because there was no
indication that Fonte made any particular provision to allot time specifically
to the client's claims or that he turned away other business to handle their
matter.2 ' In looking at contested fees, the court stated that a lawyer is not
permitted to set fees unilaterally and if a client contests the fees charged, the
lawyer has to place the disputed funds in a trust account until the dispute is
resolved.2"2 The court held that Fonte was not only obligated to maintain
adequate records of fees drawn against the $5000 retainer and any
subsequent payments for services, but also to provide the clients with an
appropriate accounting.253
The Oregon Supreme Court recently held that failing to return an
unearned fee caused the fee to be excessive even though the fees may have
been reasonable at the inception of the representation. 2m In a disciplinary
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. In re Fonte, 1994 WL 92387 *1 (Cal. Bar Ct. March 16, 1994).
246. Id. at *2.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *3.
250. Id. at *2 (citing Baranski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 153, 164 n.4 (1979)).
251. Id. at *3.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *4.
254. In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136, 139 (Or. 1993).
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proceeding, Lawyer Gastineau was charged with collecting excessive fees,
incompetent or neglectful representation, failing to carry out contract
employment, and failing to respond in a timely manner to the state bar's
request for information regarding the complaints lodged against him.25
Five clients complained that Gastineau entered into a "nonrefundable"
fee contract with them between August 1988 and September 1989, but the
lawyer failed to complete any services under the contracts.2 ' In determining
if these nonrefundable fee contracts were reasonable, the court considered
several factors similar to those provided in Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-
69.257 The court in Gastineau also adopted the reasonable person standard
stating that if a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite
and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee, then the fee
is excessive.25
In Gastineau, the defendant used a contract form that required advance
payment of a fixed-fee amount in return for the lawyer's promise to perform
a particular professional task.259 The court noted that the task involved was
generally stated and handwritten into the printed form contract." The fee
was clearly described as nonrefundable and the terms of the contract only
allowed the lawyer the option to terminate the contract for lack of payment
by the client.26" ' The court also noted that the lawyer's contract was
inconsistent in some areas regarding payment of the retainer. For example,
one part of the agreement stated that the fee had to be paid in full before
there was representation, but another part of the agreement stated that the
retainer would be applied to the fees and costs earned by the lawyer.2 62 The
court concluded that the lawyer and the clients agreed that the stated fee was
for the lawyer's efforts, and not for any "hoped-for" results.2 63
In dealing with the issue of excessive fees, the lawyer argued that there
was no violation because the fees were reasonable at the time he and the
client entered into the initial agreement."6 The court determined that the
lawyer violated Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A) when he entered into the
agreement, collected the nonrefundable fee, and failed to perform according
255. Id. at 137.
256. Id.
257. Id. Mich. Ethics Op. RI-69, 1991 WL 519888 *1 (Mich. Standing Comm. on
Professional & Judicial Ethics Feb. 14, 1991). For a list of these factors, see text
accompanying note 225.
258. Gastineau, 857 P.2d at 137. See Mich. Ethics Op. RI-69 at *1.
259. Gastineau, 857 P.2d at 137.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 139.
264. Id.
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to the agreement."' Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A) also provides that a lawyer
cannot enter into an agreement for, collect, or charge an illegal or excessive
fee.266 Because the lawyer failed to perform according to the contract, his
fees were excessive.2 67 The court noted that this decision related to flat fee
agreements only and did not necessarily apply to contingent fee
agreements.268
In In re Cain, Lawyer Cain represented clients in a quiet title action.269
The clients retained Cain's firm to clear title to trust property of a long-term
lease with an option to purchase.27° The clients were unsophisticated in real
estate matters, but Cain knew that the nine acres in dispute was quite
valuable when he accepted representation of the clients.27" ' Cain and the
clients entered into a written retainer agreement which provided that the
clients would pay a nonrefundable retainer fee of $5000 to his firm, plus a
contingency fee of 10% of the gross value of the clients' entire nine-acre
property.2 However, the agreement did not specify the time at which the
property would be valued to calculate the contingency, nor did the
agreement clarify whether costs and expenses would be deducted from the
recovery before or after the 10% gross value calculation was made.273
Cain's clients lost the quiet title action. Cain explained the court's ruling
to his client and advised them of their options.274 They requested that Cain
appeal the ruling and agreed, in writing, to increase the contingent fee to
20% of the gross value of the property for the appeal. 275
Cain filed the appeal, but while the appeal was pending, Cain
negotiated with the lessees on his clients' behalf and also negotiated with
outside prospective buyers for the property.276 The clients agreed to sell the
property to an outside buyer in October 1979. The lessees stipulated to a
dismissal of the appeal with prejudice and entered into a mutual cancellation
of the lease.277 In May 1981, the clients paid Cain and his firm in full for
the legal services.278
265. Id. at 140.
266. Id. at 139.
267. Id. at 140.
268. Id. at 139.
269. In re Cain, 852 P.2d 407, 410 (Ariz. 1993).
270. Id. at 408.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 409.
277. Id.
278. Id. A few months later, Cain borrowed $150,000 from the clients for a two year
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The committee applied the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions in determining the appropriate sanction for Cain. The committee
that initially heard the complaint found that Cain violated Disciplinary Rule
2-106(B) for charging excessive fees. The committee looked to the ABA's
standards, which reprimand lawyers who violate a professional duty by
charging excessive fees.279 The committee found that Cain's retainer
agreement created a conflict of interest in violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-
101 because it failed to specify clearly the nature of the contingency. 280 The
committee also found that Cain violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104 when he
borrowed funds from the clients and sold a promissory note to them without
advising them to seek independent counsel. 28' The committee applied the
ABA's standard which suspends a lawyer who knows of a conflict of
interest but fails to disclose the conflict to his client.282 Cain's agreement
was ambiguous and a conflict of interest resulted.283 In addition, he failed
period with interest payable at the rate of 17% per annum. Later that day, he borrowed
$50,000 under the same terms. However, the $150,000 was an unsecured loan for nearly two
years and the $50,000 loan was never secured. Id. Although he did not advise the clients to
seek independent counsel in order to determine the feasibility of lending him the funds, he
did repay both loans in full. Id. Nevertheless, Cain's conduct exhibited dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, and misrepresentation when he failed to secure the loan from his clients in direct
violation of DR 5-104 (1980). Id. at 410. In September 1981, Cain agreed not to charge the
clients additional attorney's fees in partial consideration for the loans the clients had made
to him. Id. at 409. At that time, there were no outstanding attorney's fees. Id.
In November 1981, Cain sold the clients a $29,000 promissory note for $21,000, but
he failed to mention that he had purchased the note for $17,000. Id. Again, he did not advise
the clients to seek independent counsel regarding this transaction. Id. In February 1983, the
clients and their new attorney requested that Cain repurchase the note for $21,000. Id. The
clients kept the interest paid on the note to that date. Id. In December 1981 and January
1982, Cain made two loans to the clients totalling $4350. Id. Cain repaid himself from the
clients' trust fund for more than what he was entitled to, and he claimed the overpayment
was the result of a bookkeeping error. Id.
In April 1982, Cain converted $5000 of the clients' trust funds for his own use and
possession without permission or authority to do so. Id. He claimed the funds were for
delinquent lawyer's fees, but the check stub indicated it was for an advance and retainer for
attorney's fees. Id. The stub also noted that it was a loan to him. Id. Cain maintained
inadequate records of the clients' funds and failed to keep the clients' funds segregated from
his funds; he inaccurately kept records of the hours spent on the clients' work; he did not
inform the clients of their account balances; and he never sent statements or notice to the
clients of funds disbursed or received by the trust. Id.
In February 1989, Cain voluntarily placed himself on inactive status and has not
practiced law since that time. Id. at 409-10.
279. Id. at 410.
280. Id. (citing MCPR, supra note 45, DR 5-101 (1980)).
281. Id. (citing MRPC, supra note 43, DR 5-101 (1980)).
282. Id.
283. Id.
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to advise his clients to seek independent counsel regarding the transactions
between him and his clients.2 '
Additionally, the committee found that Cain violated Disciplinary Rule
9-102(A) and (B) as well as Disciplinary Rule 6-1-1(A)(3) because he failed
to keep his funds and his clients' funds separate and he failed to maintain
adequate records.285 The committee looked to Standard 4.41 which provides
for disbarment where the lawyer fails to perform services for the client, or
where there are patterns of neglect causing serious or potentially serious
injury to the client. 86 The committee found that the nonexistent record-
keeping and the commingling of funds could potentially cause serious injury
to the clients.287 The committee also stated that Standard 4.41 is applicable
where the lawyer knowingly converts client property, as Cain did when he
knowingly overpaid himself $5000 from the clients' account without their
permission.28"
The committee then turned to aggravating and mitigating factors in the
case. The aggravating factors included dishonesty, a pattern of misconduct,
multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct, and the vulnerability of the clients. For mitigation, the committee
looked to Cain's record of no prior disciplinary measures, Cain's coopera-
tive attitude toward the proceedings, and the remorse exhibited by Cain for
his conduct.289
The committee recognized that sanctions should be consistent with the
most serious instance of misconduct involving multiple violations;
nevertheless, the committee made exceptions under the circumstances.290
There was substantial delay in processing the case, which resulted in
prejudice to Cain. Although the committee made it clear that delays will
often occur and future respondents should not presume that "credit" will be
given for time lapses, the delay in this case happened throughout the
disciplinary process and none of the delays were attributable to Cain.29" '
Because Cain had terminated his practice in 1989 and there were
unique delays in the proceedings, the court recommended a two-year
suspension for Cain.292  Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the
284. Id.
285. Id. See DR 9-102(A)-(B) (1980); DR 6-101(A)(3) (1980).
286. Cain, 852 P.2d at 411. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS
Standard 4.41 (1991).
287. Cain, 852 P.2d at 411.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 412.
292. Id.
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committee did not think it was fair to impose a four-year suspension. If this
sanction had been imposed, Cain could not reapply for admission to the bar
until 1996, seven years after terminating his practice.29 3 The committee
stated that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not contemplate a
suspension or disbarment that lasts more than five years. Based on these
facts, the committee determined that a seven-year suspension would be an
unfair sanction. 294
In Stegall v. Mississippi Bar, Mississippi disbarred a lawyer for
repeatedly keeping unearned fees.295 Lawyer Stegall's violations included
neglect of cases, failure to reasonably inform clients of the progression of
their cases, failure to return clients' property and render accounting of
clients' funds, and misrepresentation of the services to be provided in
exchange for quoted fees.296
The facts are basically the same in both the cases against Stegall. He
represented prison inmates who were seeking to file a motion for post-
conviction relief.297 Stegall advised the inmates that the fees for representa-
tion and filing the motion were $5000.29' He spoke with family members
of the inmates who agreed to pay the fees in two installments.2 99 Stegall,
however, never explained that the first $2500 was nonrefundable. 3"
Furthermore, Stegall never clarified the time frame of "before he did the
case" or "prior to hearing" for payment of the remaining $2500 to ensure
commencement of representation. 0'
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Stegall v. Mississippi Bar, 618 So. 2d 1291, 1296 (Miss. 1993).
296. Id. at 1294.
297. Id. at 1292-93.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1292-93. One inmate, Roger Harveston, sent Stegall a letter requesting
representation. Id. The deadline for filing his motion was August 20, 1989. Id. at 1292.
Because there was no clarification of exactly when Harveston's family would pay the rest
of the retainer fee, they expected to pay on the day of trial. Id. His family testified that if the
fee had to be paid before filing, it would have been paid because they borrowed the whole
$5000 and could have paid immediately. Id. As the deadline approached, Harveston's father
repeatedly attempted to contact Stegall. Id. Harveston also tried to contact him to request a
status report on his case and eventually a refund of the money and a return of his case
materials. Id. Stegall no longer responded to either of them. Id. Stegall alleged that he was
still waiting on the funds from Harveston's family to file the motion and that a refund was
not part of the agreement. Id. at 1292. Stegall also admitted that Harveston's materials were
returned over a year after they were requested, and he attributed it to an office error. Id. On
August 8, 1989, Harveston began to draft his own motion from memory and filed it pro se
on August 15, 1989. Id.
In the case of Jerry Fairman, another inmate who sought Stegall's representation,
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Stegall testified that he called the fees retainers and that the retainers
were "payable before hearing" because the fees became nonrefundable in the
event that the final installment was not paid. 2 Stegall conceded that he
interpreted the fee agreements to mean that, in cases where the second
payment was not made, he could keep the initial payment without perform-
ing any services."
In determining the severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court
considered five factors: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the need to
deter similar misconduct; (3) the preservation of dignity and reputation of
the legal profession; (4) the protection of the public; and (5) the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.3" The court noted that its decision was to be
based in part on the three-fold purpose of punishment such as: the obvious
intent to punish the wrongdoer appropriately for the offense; utility in
deterrence of further violations by the offender and the general community;
and reinforcing confidence of the general public in the ability of society to
govern itself.
305
The court recognized that the ultimate sanction imposed depended on
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As aggravating factors, the
court considered prior disciplinary offenses, dishonesty, patterns of
misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature
of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law.306 The
court acknowledged that Stegall had a history of complaints against him,
two of which resulted in private reprimands. 7 In the first situation, Stegall
was found to have neglected a matter after receiving a fee from his client.
In the other matter, Stegall failed to return the clients' papers and promptly
refund any unearned fees paid in advance when his employment was
terminated.0 The mitigating factors were Stegall's virtuous reputation
among his peers, his cooperation during the proceedings, and his service in
the United States Army.3 9 The court held that disbarment was proper,
virtually the same situation occurred. On January 20, 1989, Stegall agreed to file his motion
and stated his retainer fee would be $5000. Id. On April 7, 1989, Stegall received $2500
from Fairman's mother. Id. Beginning in August 1989, Fairman and his family began to write
and telephone Stegall for status reports regarding his case. Id. In November, Fairman's
mother wrote Stegall stating that seven months had passed without a status report. Id. She
requested a refund and a return of her son's case materials if no work was to be done. Id.
302. Id. at 1293.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1294.
305. Id. at 1294-95.
306. Id. at 1295.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1296.
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because Stegall failed to learn from his four prior reprimands and admoni-
tions and continued to deal with his clients in a manner that left them
uninformed, frustrated, and justifiably dissatisfied with the lack of represen-
tation.3
An Ohio lawyer received an indefinite suspension for charging
excessive fees and engaging in deceptive conduct.3"' This case involved
consolidated complaints against the lawyer for disciplinary infractions
brought by the bar and a complaint from clients who the lawyer represented
in employment discrimination cases.3" In the first situation, the lawyer
quoted clients an hourly fee of $150 or alternatively, a "nonrefundable
retainer" of $12,000, plus a contingency fee of 40% of any recovery.3"3 The
clients tendered $6000, a portion of the retainer fee and agreed to pay the
remainder in installments including a $100 consultation fee. l4
Within a few months, the lawyer advised his clients that they had no
case and should settle for six months severance pay.3 15 The clients stated
that the lawyer also agreed to forgo any contingency fee and the balance
owed on the retainer fee.316 In October 1990, the clients took his advice and
settled.3" 7 The clients and their employer agreed that the clients could keep
the disability payments received through October, and the employer agreed
to give her both a neutral employment reference and a lump sum settlement
of $5,945.23 representing two and one-half months of severance pay. 318 At
the settlement, the clients expected the employer to give them a check for
the settlement amount, payable to them.319 However, the lawyer had
privately requested the employer to add his name to the check.32 He then
falsely suggested to the clients that the check amount was incorrect and that
he would send them their money within a few days. 32' After the settlement,
the clients fired the lawyer.
22
The lawyer deposited the check in his IOLTA trust account, without the
clients' authorization or endorsement, and later transferred the funds to his
310. Id.
311. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Okocha, 632 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ohio 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct 751 (1995).
312. Id. at 1285.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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personal account.323 The lawyer then billed the clients for $2,487.71, the
balance of the $6000 retainer, plus 40% of the settlement, minus the
$5,945.23 he had received in the settlement.324 When the clients refused to
pay this amount, the lawyer sued and the clients cross-claimed. A jury
awarded the clients $5,945.23 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages. 25
In the hearing for disciplinary charges before the bar, the panel found
that the lawyer had falsely informed the bar that the employer requested his
name be added to the check.32 6 Furthermore, the panel found that the lawyer
gave false testimony regarding the fee agreement and his removal of the
settlement from the IOLTA account.327
In the second situation, the lawyer consulted with a client regarding
wrongful termination of employment.328 On September 10, 1990, the client
signed an agreement promising to pay a nonrefundable retainer fee of
$12,000 and an additional contingency fee of 40% of any recovered sums.329
A week later, the client notified the lawyer that she no longer wanted him
to represent her.33 The client received a bill for $16,469.79, which
consisted of the $2000 retainer, $2320 for an associate's services, and $2100
for the lawyer's services and expenses.331 The lawyer also failed to return
the client's documents after he was fired.332
The panel determined that the lawyer had violated Disciplinary Rule 2-
106(A) by charging excessive fees in both instances.33 As a result of his
violations, the lawyer was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law
in Ohio.33
4
The Advisory Committee of the New Jersey Bar stated that non-
refundable retainers are not per se unethical, but are always subject to the
overriding precept that any fee arrangement must be reasonable and fair to
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1285-86.
331. Id. at 1286.
332. Id.
333. Id. The panel also found that the lawyer violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 9-102.
Id. These rules govern conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,
and preserving the identity of a client's funds and property, respectively. Id. The lawyer
violated these rules when he withdrew the client's funds from his escrow account without the
client's consent after he had been discharged and when he knowingly made
misrepresentations to the bar about the clients. Id.
334. Id.
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the client.335 It also stated that the applicable Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not deal explicitly with the subject of nonrefundable retainer
fees, but there are eight factors to be considered in determining if a fee is
reasonable.336 One factor that inferentially supports the view that a retainer
may be fully earned is "the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer." '337 Therefore, the fee is nonrefundable when the lawyer is able
to provide the anticipated representation, whether or not the lawyer actually
provides the services.338 Nonetheless, the committee provides that it did not
directly consider the question of nonrefundable retainer fees.339
The Committee stated that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.16(d) deals with termination of representation and mandates the
refund of any advance fee payment that has not been earned."O However,
the rule does not address the question of whether a fee may be considered
earned upon receipt or under what circumstances a fee may be considered
"earned" upon receipt.34' Thus, the rule, by its terms, does not preclude
nonrefundable retainers.342 In New Jersey, courts have not held that a
general retainer fee must be deposited in a trust account or that Disciplinary
Rule 9-102(A) clearly requires that a general retainer fee be deposited.343
New Jersey follows the rule that a general retainer fee does not have to be
deposited in a lawyer's trust account, absent an explicit understanding that
the retainer be separately maintained." Further, the New Jersey Committee
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct stated that "[r]equiring [the]
deposit of such funds in a trust account would not prevent lawyers from
failing to perform work that they have undertaken" and that "such a
requirement would interfere significantly with the variety of retainer fee
arrangements that have served the interests of both lawyers and their
clients., 345 The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the committee's view
which does not require a retainer fee to be deposited in the lawyer's trust
335. N.J. Ethics Op. 644, 1990 WL 441610, at *1 (N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional
Ethics Oct. 11, 1990).
336. Id. For a list of these factors, see supra text accompanying note 165.
337. N.J. Ethics Op. 644, at *1.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at *2.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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account. 46 The court also adopted a written communication requirement. "
Thus, if a lawyer does not regularly represent a client, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(b) requires a written communication from the
lawyer to the clients explaining the basis or rate of the fee.48 However, the
court did not adopt the committee's suggestion that the disposition of
advance payments should be included in such written communications.349
The committee stated that because of the "explicit rejection" of the trust
fund approach by both the court and its committee, it can be concluded that,
in New Jersey, the disposition of retainer fees may properly be left to an
agreement between the parties.350 Therefore, the committee held that it is
not unethical for a lawyer to charge a nonrefundable retainer, provided that
the fee arrangement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.3 5 ' The
committee, however, did find that an initially reasonable nonrefundable
retainer arrangement could become unreasonable because of subsequent
unforeseen circumstances. 52 Any unused portion of a retainer, including
nonrefundable retainers, should be returned if it would be unconscionable
for the lawyer to keep the retainer.353
In AFLAC v. Williams, M the Georgia Supreme Court discussed whether
a client must pay legal fees to a lawyer under a long-term retainer contract
and whether a damages clause was a liquidated damages provision or a
penalty. In Williams, the chief executive officer ("CEO") of AFLAC and
the lawyer entered into a seven-year agreement in 1987 for legal services on
an "as needed basis., 355 The contract contained an automatic renewal clause
in 1995 for an additional five years, unless the contract was terminated.5
If the company ended the contract, even for good cause, it agreed to pay
fifty percent of the amount due under the remaining terms, plus the renewal
of the agreement.357 After AFLAC's founder died in 1990, the new CEO
terminated the lawyer's services.358
The court held that a lawyer cannot recover damages under a penalty
clause when a client exercises the legal right to terminate the lawyer's
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. AFLAC v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 1994).
355. Id. at 315-16.
356. Id. at 316.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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retainer contract.359 The court stated that a lawyer-client relationship is a
unique relationship founded on elements of trust and confidence by the
client and of undivided loyalty and devotion by the lawyer.3 60  If this
relationship was forced into the conventional status of a commercial
contract, the special fiduciary relationship would be destroyed.36' Because
of this fiduciary relationship, the client has the absolute right to terminate
the relationship at any given time, even without cause.3 62 This right is not
viewed as a breach of contract, but rather as an exercise of the client's
right.363 Therefore, if the client was required to pay damages for terminating
the relationship, that right would essentially be abrogated."
In reviewing the language of the agreement in the Williams case, the
court analyzed the damages Clause under contract law and found that it was
unenforceable.3 65  To enforce a provision as liquidated damages, three
factors must exist: (1) the injury must be difficult to estimate accurately; (2)
the parties must intend to provide damages instead of a penalty; and (3) the
sum must be a reasonable estimate of the probable lOSS.3 6 6  The court
determined that the provision was essentially a penalty used to force
AFLAC to continue the relationship, even if there was good cause to
terminate the relationship.3 67 The court also held that the damages were
unreasonably high, not withstanding the lawyer's duty to mitigate his
damages.16' Further, the court noted that the decision only dealt with
contracts of lawyers in private practice and did not address the employment
relationship between employers and full-time or in-house counsel.3 69
Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union370 discussed whether a
renewable one-year agreement for legal services between a lawyer and his
client is governed by general contract principles or principles modified by
359. Id.
360. Id. (quoting Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981)).
361. Id.
362. Id. (quoting White v. Aiken, 28 S.E.2d 263, 265 (Ga. 1943)).
363. Id. (citing Dorsey v. Edge, 43 S.E.2d 425, 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947)).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 317.
366. Id. (citing Southeastern Land Fund, Inc. v. Real Estate World, Inc., 227 S.E.2d 340,
344 (1976)).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 315 n.1.
370. Cohen v. Radio-Elecs. Officers Union, 645 A.2d 1248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994). ROU is a labor organization that represents radio officers who are responsible for the
communications and electronics aboard ocean-going vessels. Id. at 1251. ROU and employers
contribute funds to various affiliated plans and trusts to provide medical, vacation, and other
benefits to its union members. Id.
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ethical considerations and standards applicable to the practice of law. In
1985 Thomas Harper, the secretary-treasurer of Radio-Electronics Officers
Union ("ROU"), sought legal services from Lawyer Cohen, who was a
partner with Marchi, Jaffe, Cohen, Crystal, Rosner & Katz ("Marchi
firm"). 7 ' Cohen and ROU entered into an agreement for legal services for
a one-year term which was automatically renewable unless there was a
written termination notice given during June of the year preceding the
termination date.372 On January 4, 1986, the Marchi firm and ROU entered
into a contract in which ROU was to pay $150 per hour for legal services.373
In 1987, Cohen decided to leave the firm and move to Arizona to accept an
adjunct associate professorship with the University of Arizona School of
Law.3 74 If he decided to pursue a full-time position, he had to notify the law
school in June of the year in which he sought full-time employment.375 The
facts are disputed as to how ROU became a client of Cohen's, but the
parties entered into an agreement effective January 1, 1988, whereby Cohen
would be general counsel for ROU after he relocated to Arizona.3 76 The
parties agreed to an annual compensation of $100,000 for 1000 hours of
service.171 ROU also agreed that Cohen would be designated co-counsel for
all applicable ROU plans and trusts.378 Any compensation received by
Cohen from those plans or trusts would entitle ROU to additional hours of
free service at the rate of one hour per $100 of compensation from the plans
or trusts.3 79 The agreement also permitted Cohen to charge $150 per hour
for any time in excess of 1000 hours, excluding the additional time
attributable to compensation from the plans or trusts.3" Additionally, Cohen
had to be available for telephone consultation during ROU's regular business
hours within twenty-four hours of the phone call."' If the call was an
emergency, Cohen had to be available within three hours by phone.382 If
Cohen was unavailable for good cause, he had to provide appropriate
substitute coverage at his own cost.383
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1250.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1251-52.
382. Id. at 1252.
383. Id.
[Vol. 18
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MONEY
In January 1988, Cohen submitted invoices for legal services
rendered.3" An ROU auditor found that Cohen should have reimbursed
ROU for $8079 it had already paid the Marchi firm for legal services.385 On
December 10, 1989, Harper advised Cohen that the plan's trustees had
decided to replace him as co-counsel.386 On December 28, 1989, Harper
notified Cohen that effective January 1, 1990, he was terminated as general
counsel.387 At that point, ROU had fully paid for legal services rendered
through December 31, 1989, but refused to pay him an additional $100,000
for 1990.388
The trial court construed the agreement under general contract
principles, stating that ROU had to provide advance notice to terminate the
agreement.389 The court found the notice fair and reasonable, because Cohen
had to be available to ROU at any time, and he had to give notice to the
University of Arizona that he was interested in joining its faculty by June
of each year.390 The court found that the clause of the agreement giving
ROU a one hour credit for each $100 received by Cohen from the trusts or
plans was illegal and a breach of duty by both parties when the provision
was included in the retainer agreement. 39' However, the other compensation
provisions were determined to be severable and enforceable. 92 The trial
court also found that ROU did not discharge Cohen for cause and that
Cohen had a duty to mitigate damages.393
The appellate court stated that transactions between a lawyer and client
are subject to close scrutiny by the court and the burden of establishing
fairness and equity of the transaction rests upon the lawyer.394 The court
also acknowledged that a lawyer should refrain from engaging in a business
transaction with a client who has not obtained independent legal advice.3 9
Additionally, the court determined that the fees were unreasonable.396 In
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1253.
394. Id. (citing In re Gallop, 426 A.2d 509, 511 (N.J. 1981); In re Nichols, 469 A.2d
494, 497 (N.J. 1984)).
395. Id. (citing In re Gravel, 125 A.2d 696 (N.J. 1956)).
396. Id.
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determining if the fees were unreasonable, the court looked at the same
factors provided in Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-69.s97
The court then stated that a nonrefundable retainer agreement affects
the willingness and ability of the client to terminate the services of the
lawyer at any time, no matter how long employment was agreed upon.39
Because the client has a right to terminate her lawyer, the court stated that
the lawyer is entitled to quantum meruit when there was no cause for
termination.399 The court held that the agreement was void according to the
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct which states that a lawyer cannot
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or excessive fee,
and when discharged, has to promptly refund any fee paid in advance that
was not earned.' The court also stated that because the agreement between
the lawyer and client is special, it is not to be treated like a regular contract
and the lawyer cannot sue for breach of contract if the client prematurely
terminates the agreement."' The client's right to terminate at will is implied
in law from the special relationship between the lawyer and client. 2
The court did recognize that other jurisdictions have followed the
traditional view of treating an agreement between a lawyer and client as an
ordinary contract, and applied general contract law. 3  The factors
supporting the traditional view are: (1) contracting for the full value of the
services as determined by the parties as well as offering the most logical
measure of damages; (2) charging the full fee prohibits a client from
profiting from his own breach of contract; and (3) ameliorating the difficult
task of valuing a lawyer's partially completed work.'
The court held that the agreement was analogous to a nonrefundable
retainer that infringed upon the right of the client to terminate the lawyer-
client relationship at will. 5 As a result, the agreement was unreasonable
and unenforceable because it was against public policy.' Moreover, the
agreement burdened the client with an unwanted lawyer and made the client
pay fees for legal services that the lawyer failed to render. °7
397. Id. For a list of these factors, see supra text accompanying note 225.
398. Cohen, 645 A.2d at 1254.
399. Id. (citing In re Poliv, 338 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).
400. Id. at 1255 (citing DR 2-106(A) (1980)).
401. Id. at 1256 (citing Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1916)).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1257.
404. Id. (citing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1019-20 (Fla. 1982)).
405. Id. at 1250.
406. Id.
407. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Baime stated that a lawyer's duty to mitigate
damages from a breach by the client does not sufficiently protect the client from what is in
essence, a contractual penalty. Id. at 1260 (Baime, J., concurring).
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Brandes v. Zingmonde8 discussed whether a nonrefundable matrimonial
agreement was valid and enforceable. In Brandes, the client agreed to pay
a minimum nonrefundable fee of $15,000 to assure the availability of her
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Villanueva did not think the bargained-for terms of
the agreement were unreasonable or unethical. Id. at 1261 (Villanueva, J., concurring and
dissenting). Judge Villanueva differentiated between special retainers, general retainers and
nonrefundable retainers and based his dissenting opinion on the differences. Id. at 1261. A
special retainer is an agreement between the lawyer and client in which the client agrees to
pay a specified fee in exchange for specified services. Id. In a general retainer, the client
agrees to pay a fixed sum in consideration for the lawyer's continual availability to perform
at a specified price during the specified period for any necessary legal services. Id. It is
separate from fees incurred for rendered services because the client is paying for availability.
Id. The dissent went on to state that the agreement was really an option contract (that was
a general retainer) because the client had the right to direct the lawyer to render services at
any time during the specified period. The dissent also' recognized that the parties could
create a hybrid general-special retainer by agreeing that part or all of the general retainer fee
be applied to the bill for services actually rendered. Id. Judge Villanueva stated that a
nonrefundable retainer allows the lawyer to keep an advance payment whether or not services
were rendered. Id. A nonrefundable retainer is a type of special retainer because it arises only
in conjunction with rendering specified services for a specified fee. Id.
The dissent recognized that there are sacrifices made by the lawyer who is committed
to general retainers, such as reallocation of time so they can be available at any time to the
exclusion of other clients and forgoing potential income because they cannot be hired by
conflicting interests. Id. The dissent stated that Cohen made those sacrifices; the agreement
was actually more like an employment contract because Cohen was obligated to furnish legal
services and remain available to furnish those services on short notice. Id. at 1262. The
dissent provided that contracts for contingency fees or particularized services entitled the
lawyer to quantum meruit for services performed. Id. at 1263. However, lawyers and clients
should not be precluded from freely entering into fair and reasonable contracts, where the
client carefully considered and freely agreed to the contract with full knowledge of the
situation. Id. Bona fide, reasonable retainer agreements for a fixed term based on mutual
considerations should be enforceable. Id. Judge Villanueva reasoned that in not doing so,
clients and lawyers would not be inclined to make agreements for reduced compensation in
return for assurance of availability for a fixed period of time. Id. at 1266. The dissent also
placed great weight on Cohen's expert witness who stated that in looking at the
circumstances, the agreement appeared to be fair, Cohen was a highly specialized and
experienced attorney, ROU was an international union that essentially engaged in the
business of negotiating contracts for its members, and Cohen's price was below market value.
Id. at 1266-67. It was reasonable to include a long notice period as well as an automatic
renewal. Id. at 1266. Judge Villanueva stated that the agreement met the requirements of the
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT for a reasonable fee and that the agreement
should be enforced. Id. The dissent further stated that ROU did not believe the agreement
was unfair and took advantage of the agreement during the two-year period in which it
enjoyed Cohen's reduced hourly rate. Id. The agreement was not unconscionable until ROU
wrongfully terminated it. Id. at 1267. ROU was aware that Cohen planned his professional
life based on the contract and renewal notice and Cohen relied on the agreement to his
detriment. Id. Nevertheless, ROU did not raise the mitigating issue and Cohen did not have
an opportunity to rebut it. Id. at 1269. This was done by the trial court and the dissent said
that there should not have been any mitigation of damages. Id. at 1269.
408. Brandes v. Zingmond, 573 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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lawyer.' There was also a clause that stated that in signing the agreement,
the client acknowledged that she received a copy and that she read and
understood the agreement before signing.41 The lawyer represented the
client in divorce proceedings.41' However, the client reconciled with her
husband and then discharged her lawyer after he had spent five hours on the
case.4" 2 The court held that the agreement was unenforceable and that the
lawyer had a duty to promptly refund any unearned fee paid in advance.4" 3
The court relied on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
which stated that the specified minimum cannot be excessive under the
circumstances, that nonrefundability must be expressly conditioned on the
absence of lawyer default, and the agreement must be written in clear
unambiguous language fully known and understood by the client. 44 The
court held that the agreement failed to specifically state that nonrefundability
was conditioned on the absence of lawyer fault and under what conditions
the client was eligible for a refund.4 " The court held that the fee was
"grossly excessive and shocking to the Court's conscience. 41 6 In determin-
ing that the fee was reasonable, the court considered the same factors
provided in Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-69.417
The court found that the fee provision was really a liquidated damages
provision, which is only enforceable if the amount set is reasonably
proportional to the probable loss and if actual loss would be difficult to
calculate or precisely estimate.418 In contrast, the court stated that a penalty
is an amount disproportionate to the real damage that is used to secure
performance by compulsion.419 As a result, a promisor would be compelled
to continue performance based on fear of economic devastation and the
promisee would reap a windfall compared to the actual loss in the event of
a default.420
The court noted factors to consider in determining if the clause is a
penalty, such as the level of sophistication of the parties and whether either
party is a member of the bar or is represented by able counsel during the
409. Id. at 580.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 582.
414. Id. (citing New York Bar Ass'n Op. 599 (1980)).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. For a list of these factors see supra text accompanying note 225.
418. Id. at 582.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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negotiation and execution of the agreement.42' The court found no evidence
that the client had a certain level of sophistication or that she was knowl-
edgeable of the subject matter of the agreement during her divorce
proceedings.422 The lawyer, however, was a highly sophisticated and well-
known matrimonial lawyer.423 The court further provided that because the
lawyer-client relationship is so special, many principles found in the
relationship would not survive ordinary contract law.424  As a result,
agreements made in this unique relationship are not always enforceable in
the same manner as ordinary commercial contracts.4 25 The court also stated
that because there are wider social implications involved in the matrimonial
field, the court's traditional authority to regulate fee agreements between the
lawyer and client is broader. 426 The liquidated damages provision in the
agreement existed to circumscribe the client's right to terminate counsel.427
Therefore, upholding such an agreement would be against social policy and
foster an atmosphere adverse to reconciliation.428
The lawyer argued that he was precluded from spending time and
energy on behalf of other potential clients, but the agreement stated that an
unspecified and unlimited number of associates and paralegals could handle
the client's divorce matter.429 The court provided the lawyer an opportunity
to produce a list of those clients that were denied services as a result of time
expended on this case, but the lawyer failed to provide the list.43
The court further held that nonrefundable retainer agreements violate
the concept of mitigation of damages.43" ' However, because the client has
the unfettered right to discharge the lawyer, it follows that the client cannot
be held liable for damages in a breach of contract.432 The court determined
that even if the client was held to damages, the lawyer was required to
mitigate damages which he failed to demonstrate.433 The court found that
the agreement was not a good faith estimate of damages, but a way to
421. Id. (citing Boyle v. Petrie Stores Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 854, 861 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987)).
422. Id. at 582-83.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 583 (quoting In re Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 402 (N.Y. 1912)).
425. Id. at 582 (quoting Cohen v. Ryan, 311 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)).
426. Id. at 583.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 584.
431. Id.
432. Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Sassower, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. App. Div.) aft'd,
489 N.E.2d 1283 (N.Y.) aff'd, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
433. Id.
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ensure absolute payment of the lawyer's fees.4' The lawyer also argued that
the client consented to the agreement and understood the terms of his
employment.435 The court held that consent alone does not demonstrate the
client's awareness and complete understanding of legal rights and obliga-
tions.436 Because of the client's emotional state resulting from the pending
divorce, she could not have comprehended the meaning of the agreement.437
The agreement was unenforceable and the lawyer was entitled to only
quantum meruit if there was no legal cause for discharge.43 The court
acknowledged that in determining the value of the legal services, the court
would consider "the nature and extent of the services, the actual time spent,
the necessity therefor, the nature of the issues involved, the professional
standing of counsel and the results achieved."439 The court determined that
the discharge occurred because the client reconciled with her husband."
Thus, the court held that quantum meruit was the proper remedy."
The Williams, Cohen, and Brandes courts" 2 held that the fiduciary
nature of the lawyer-client relationship causes fee arrangements to rise above
the standards of ordinary commercial contract. There were three underlying
themes regarding nonrefundable retainers through these recent cases: (1) the
nature of the lawyer-client relationship is such that it cannot be lumped into
the conventional status of a commercial contract; (2) public policy dictates
that the client has an unfettered right to discharge the lawyer and be
refunded any money that was not earned by the lawyer; and (3) because of
the client's unfettered right to terminate, the lawyer can recover the
reasonable value of any services rendered under a theory of quantum meruit
if there was termination without legal cause.
Other courts have found nonrefundable fees excessive and unreason-
able. 4" 3  Although not finding that nonrefundable contracts are per se
434. Id.
435. Id. See Scheenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 530 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (N.Y. Supp.
1988).
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. (quoting Jordan v. Freeman, 336 N.Y.S.2d 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)). See
Sand v. Lammers, 540 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
440. Id.
441. Id. See Teichver v. W & J Holsteins, 489 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Theroux v. Theroux, 536 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Ventola v. Ventola, 491
N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
442. AFLAC v. Williams, 444 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 1994); Cohen v. Radio-Elecs. Officers
Union, 645 A.2d 1248, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1994); Brandes v. Zingmond, 573
N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
443. See In re Cain, 852 P.2d 407, 409 (Ariz. 1993); Arens v. Committee on Professional
Conduct, 307 Ark. 308, 311, 820 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1991); In re Fonte, 1994 WL 92387 *3
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unethical or unreasonable, these courts have nevertheless required that
lawyers refund any unearned portion of a so-called nonrefundable fee. 4' In
these situations, very few fees will ever be nonrefundable.
f. Proposed Restatement on the Law of Lawyering
The proposed restatement of the law of lawyering4" also requires that
lawyers refund any unearned portion of a nonrefundable fee. The proposed
restatement discusses this issue in connection with excessive fees and in
connection with lawyer-client fee contracts. A comment to the restatement
approves "true retainers," that is, "a fee paid to ensure that a lawyer will be
available for the client if required," but also states that "a lawyer's fee may
not be unreasonably large." 6 This is qualified by the statement that such
true retainers are not excessive fees if the retainer "is a reasonable prediction
of the income the lawyer sacrifices by accepting" the retainer."7  For
example, the retainer may compensate the lawyer for turning away other
clients, or for hiring new associates to handle the client's expected
business."' Moreover, the comment distinguishes a "lump sum fee" and an
advance fee from retainers. 449
Section 50(c) of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states
that "[w]hen a lawyer requests and receives a fee payment that is not for
services already rendered, that payment is a deposit to be credited against
whatever fee the lawyer may be entitled to collect."450 A comment to the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers presumes that any fee payment
that is not for services already rendered is presumed to be a deposit against
future services. 45 ' Thus, the burden is on the lawyer to show that the client
(Cal. Bar. Ct. Mar. 16, 1994); Stegall v. Mississippi Bar, 618 So. 2d 1291 (Miss. 1993);
Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Okocha, 632 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 751 (1995); In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136, 137 (Or. 1993).
444. Cain, 852 P.2d at 409; Arens, 307 Ark. at 308, 820 S.W.2d at 264; Fonte, 1994 WL
92387, at *3; Stegall, 618 So. 2d at 1291; Okocha, 632 N.E.2d at 1286; Gastineau, 857 P.2d
at 137.
445. RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (1991) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
446. Id. at § 46 cmt. e.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at § 46 cmt. e.
450. Id. at § 46 cmt. e.
451. Id. at comment g (citing Jersey Land & Dev. Co., v. United States, 342 F. Supp.
48 (D. N.J. 1972) (determining that an advance payment is presumed to be a deposit, not a
retainer)).
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consented to some other arrangement, either a true retainer or payment in
full.45
2
The true retainer requires that the payment be a reasonable prediction
of future expenses or lost opportunities.453 The comment states that "most
clients who pay a fee without receiving an explanation assume that they are
paying for services, not readiness." 4 Finally, even true retainers or advance
fees may not be kept if the fee is unreasonable or if the lawyer withdraws
prematurely or is properly discharged.4 5
g. Structuring Fee Arrangements
Given the complexity of the advance fee rules, it is important that fee
arrangements be structured carefully. Rule 1.5(b) of the Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct requires early communication of the fee arrangement
when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client. 4 6  The rule
suggests but does not require that the fee arrangement be in writing to avoid
a misunderstanding.5 7
A "true" retainer agreement should state the amount of the retainer,
whether or not the retainer amount has been paid, and the length of time
that the retainer assures the lawyer's availability.458 In addition, all fee
arrangements should identify the client and the lawyer in charge; the
objectives of the representation; the services to be rendered; the duration of
the lawyer-client relationship; any time constraints imposed by either the
lawyer or the client; how court costs and other expenses will be handled;
how the client will be apprised of the progress of the case; how payments
and disbursements will be handled; and how the lawyer will handle trust
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(b).
457. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(b) and accompanying comment. See In re Biggs,
864 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Or. 1994) (determining that without a written agreement concerning
the nature of the fee paid, advance fees would be considered client property).
458. CAROL M. LANGFORD & MOLLY MUNGER, Ethical Issues in Connection With Fee
Agreements, at 9 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-4-519 1994).
See Mich. Ethics Op. RI-10 (1989).
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funds.459 The majority of this information can be included in a brochure that
is given to each prospective client."0
2. Funds for a Specific Purpose
Funds given to a lawyer for a specific purpose must be used for that
purpose.46' Like advances for fees and costs, they must also be segregated
from the lawyer's property and funds. Absent an agreement with and
consent by the client, a lawyer must return any unused portion of such funds
with a full accounting." 2 Some examples of these funds include estate
proceeds," 3 escrow funds, ' funds for payment of client's taxes, 5 and funds
for settlement purposes."6
3. Interest-Bearing Accounts
Lawyers may deposit client funds in interest-bearing accounts but any
interest belongs to the client, absent an agreement to the contrary.4 7 IOLTA
accounts are the exception to this rule." Forty-one states have some form
of IOLTA account.469
459. DEMETRIOS DIMITRIOU, How to Write Client Fee Agreements, (PLI Comm. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4255 1989); Marcia L. Proctor, "Smart" Fee
Agreements, 72 MICH. B. J. 1304 (December 1993). For examples of provision to be
included in fee agreements, see EDWARD L. WINER, Get Started on the Right Foot, 560 (PLI
Comm. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4321 1990).
460. NEIL T. SHAYNE, Law Office Brochures, (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A4-4150 1986). Assume you were going to build a home and when
you met with the builder you were asked for a large nonrefundable payment, even before the
job was started. If you are like most people, it would leave you feeling uncomfortable and
maybe even a little suspicious. It would seem unfair. You would need and want a lot of
communication from that professional so that you could be sure that your job was getting
proper attention from the person who "took your money."
Clients who pay nonrefundable fees feel much the same way. Unfortunately, the
nature of the fee (as described above) makes it easy to communicate infrequently with your
client. Communication takes place only when the attorney feels it is necessary. This
approach frequently leads to legal malpractice claims and ethics complaints because the
lawyer is not communicating satisfactorily from the client's perspective.
461. In re James, 452 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C. 1982).
462. Finch v. State Bar, 621 P.2d 253, 256 (Cal. 1981).
463. In re Thomas, 659 P.2d 960, 961 (Or. 1983).
464. In re Kramer, 442 N.E.2d 171, 172 (Ill. 1982).
465. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 264 (Okla. 1982).
466. In re Martinez, 431 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1982).
467. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982). See
generally LAWYER'S MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 201.
468. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42.
469. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42.
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Arkansas approved a voluntary plan in 1984.470 However, on October
17, 1994, the Arkansas Supreme Court approved a "comprehensive," i.e.,
mandatory, IOLTA plan.47' The court approved an amendment to Rule 1.15
of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct requiring lawyers to deposit
in an interest-bearing account, funds "which in the judgment of the lawyer
are nominal in amount, or are expected to be held for such a short period
of time that it is not practical to earn and account for income on individual
deposits. 4
72
These accounts must be maintained in compliance with the general
fiduciary provisions codified in Rule 1.15 of the Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct. None of the earnings from these funds will be
available to the law firm, and the funds must be available for withdrawal
"upon request and without delay. 4 73 The interest which accrues on these
accounts minus "reasonable check and deposit processing charges ... shall
be paid to the Arkansas IOLTA Foundation, Inc."474
The new rule requires that all client funds be deposited in an interest-
bearing trust account "unless they are deposited in a separate interest-bearing
account for a specific and individual matter for a particular client., 475 There
must be one account for each particular matter and any interest from these
accounts must be held in trust for the individual client.476 The decision to
470. In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account, 283 Ark. 252, 261, 675 S.W.2d 355, 358
(1984).
471. In re Arkansas IOLTA Foundation, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 846, 848-49 (1994).
472. Id. at 848.
473. Id.
474. Id. The permissible processing charges are an items deposited charge, a monthly
maintenance fee, a per item check charge, and a per deposit charge. Id. Any additional
charges are the lawyer's responsibility. Id.
475. Id. at 848-49. Lawyers exempt from this requirement include: lawyers who do not
receive any client funds in their practice; lawyers who do not practice law in Arkansas or
receive funds from Arkansas clients; and full-time judges, government lawyers, military
lawyers who do not handle client funds. Id. In addition, the IOLTA Foundation Board may
exempt lawyers or law firms for up to two years if the service charges on their trust accounts
equal or exceed any interest generated. Id.
There is some confusion regarding converting trust accounts to interest-bearing
accounts. The text of the rule indicates that the conversion must be done no later than "six
months from the date of the order adopting the rule." ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(e).
The per curiam opinion that accompanied the rule states that the "effective date of the
revised rule is January 1, 1995." In re Arkansas IOLTA Foundation, Inc., 885 S.W.2d at
848. Apparently, the provisions of the rule went into effect on January 1, 1995, but the final
date for the conversion of existing trust accounts was March 17, 1995. Any new accounts
created after January 1, 1995, or any funds received after January 1, 1995, presumably must
be deposited in the interest-bearing trust account.
476. In re Arkansas IOLTA Foundation, Inc., 885 S.W.2d at 848. Lawyers required to
maintain trust accounts must annually certify their compliance with the rule on the form that
accompanied the per curiam opinion. Id.
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use either the pooled funds account or the individual client trust account
rests within the discretion of the lawyer. To make this decision, the lawyer
should consider "[t]he amount of interest which the funds would earn during
the period they are expected to be deposited; and . . . [t]he cost of
establishing and administering the account, including the cost of the
lawyer's or law firm's services."' 7
The court considered comments from a number of people regarding this
new rule. The most significant objection questioned the propriety of
amending the rules of professional ethics instead of amending the IOLTA
rules. Sixteen other jurisdictions have already amended the equivalent rule
on client property to establish a comprehensive IOLTA program.47s In
addition, the court was confident that all the administrative monitoring of
the accounts could be done by the IOLTA staff and would not involve the
committee on professional conduct. The IOLTA board assured the court
that lawyers would be referred to the committee on professional conduct
only if they deliberately failed to comply with the provisions of the new
rule.
479
4. The Client Security Fund
Arkansas has a client security fund designed to reimburse clients for
their losses.48" A court appointed committee may consider claims for
"reimbursement of losses from defalcations . . . caused by the dishonest
conduct" of a lawyer. The lawyer must have "been disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law, or voluntarily resigned from the practice of law,
in order for the committee to consider claims for reimbursement of losses
caused by the dishonest conduct of a member of the bar."
4 1'
"Dishonest conduct" is defined to include "wrongful acts committed by
a lawyer against a client or person or organization to whom the lawyer owes
a fiduciary duty in the manner of defalcation or embezzlement of money, or
the wrongful taking or conversion of money, property, or other things of
value."' 82 The committee will only consider claims that have been referred
to it by the Committee on Professional Conduct and will not pay more than
477. Id.
478. Id. at 847.
479. Id. Both mandatory and voluntary IOLTA programs have survived constitutional
challenges. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971
(1st Cir. 1993); Carroll v. State Bar, 213 Cal. Reptr. 305, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Cone
v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987).
480. In re Client Security Fund, 254 Ark. 1075, 493 S.W.2d 422 (1973).
481. Id.
482. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ARKANSAS CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND I(5).
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$40,000 for any claim.483 The fund is subrogated by any recovery made by
the claimant, her personal representative, and her estate and assigns against
the lawyer."8 Participation in the fund is mandatory in that a portion of
each lawyer's license fee is used for the fund.485
B. Record Keeping
The Arkansas rules follow the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and provide that "[c]omplete records [of trust accounts] shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of
the representation."4 6 Arkansas has not adopted any rules or guidelines
concerning the kinds of records which lawyers must keep, but in February
1993, the ABA adopted a model recordkeeping rule as official ABA policy.
The rule is intended to emphasize Rule 1.15's requirement to keep "complete
records." It requires lawyers to maintain: receipt and disbursement journals,
a ledger book, monthly balance sheets, copies of all client statements, copies
of all bills, copies of all payments on behalf of clients, all canceled checks,
stubs, bank statements, and copies of quarterly reconciliations.
Rule 5-1.1(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar4s7 requires
lawyers to maintain the following records: "checkbooks, canceled checks,
check stubs, vouchers, ledgers and journals, closing statements, accountings
or other statements of disbursement rendered to clients or other parties with
regard to trust funds, or similar equivalent records clearly and expressly
reflecting the date, amount, source, and reason for all receipts, withdrawals
deliveries, and disbursements of the funds or property of the client."
Some states have gone beyond the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to require the following: annual certification or verification of their
compliance with the recordkeeping requirements,48 random verification or
483. Id.
484. Id. at I (4)(c).
485. Id. Consider the Arens case. The attorneys in that case were not disbarred or
suspended. Rather, they received letters of caution. Because of that sanction, the clients could
not seek reimbursement from the client security fund if the attorneys were unable to return
the excess fee. In the absence of the attorneys' cooperation, the clients' only remedy is to
sue the attorney for the amount of the unearned fee. Section 16-22-307 of the ARK. CODE
ANN. provides for a summary action whenever an attorney "receive[s] money for his client"
and refuses or fails to pay the money on demand. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-307 (Michie
1989). However, none of the cases construing the statute concerned the recovery of unearned
attorney's fees.
486. LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA)1004-06 (1993).
487. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 5-1.1(b) (1986).
488. See, e.g., Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 43(b); Ark. Sup. Ct. R.P.C. 1.15(f); New Hamp. Sup.
Ct. R. 50-A (1993); New Jersey Ct. R. 1:20-1(c) (1995).
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audits of trust accounts,489 or automatic notification to the disciplinary
authority of overdrafts.490
Some examples of violations include the failure to maintain any records
which allow the lawyer to know what amount in the trust accounts belonged
to particular clients; 491 failure to maintain cash receipts and disbursements
journal, monthly reconciliations, checkbook or bank statement balances, or
canceled checks;492 and failure to supervise properly the office staff in
charge of recordkeeping.
493
1. Notification
Rule 1. 15 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that
"[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person." 4
A lawyer must promptly notify a client of the receipt of client properties.49
Failure to promptly notify a client may itself be grounds for discipline.496
A lawyer was suspended for two years for failing to notify a client of the
receipt of child support checks and applying the funds toward the client's
outstanding balance.4 97 In another case, a lawyer was suspended for failure
to notify a client of the receipt of judgment proceeds.498
C. Delivery
Rule 1.15(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that
"[e]xcept as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive." 99 A lawyer must promptly disburse funds to which the
489. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. R. 121.4(a) (1995); New Jersey Sup. Ct. R. 1:21-6 (1995);
Wash. Sup. Ct. R. Law. Disc. 13.1(a) (1995).
490. See, e.g., Haw. Sup. Ct. R. 11 (1995); Minn. Sup. Ct. R.P.C. 1.150) (1995); Nev.
Sup. Ct. B.R. 78.5(2) (1993).
491. North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 326 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
492. In re Heffern, 351 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. 1984).
493. In re Williams, 711 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. 1986).
494. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(b).
495. In re Davis, 628 P.2d 38, 39 (Ariz. 1981).
496. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Attorney's Failure to Report Promptly Receipt of
Money or Property Belonging to Client as Ground for Disciplinary Action, 91 A.L.R.3d 975
(1979).
497. Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Presnick, 577 A.2d 1054, 1056 (Conn. 1990).
498. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Longnecker, 538 So. 2d 156, 160 (La. 1988).
499. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(b).
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client is entitled."° However, there is little agreement on the meaning of the
term "promptly."' '
All deliveries must also be proper. A lawyer may not write a check on
an account with insufficient funds 2 or make payments to a client in excess
of the amount the client had on deposit. 3 Sometimes a lawyer has a duty
not to deliver funds to a client. When a third party has some legal or
equitable claim that qualifies for special protection and of which the lawyer
is aware, the lawyer should not deliver funds to the client." 4 In addition,
a lawyer should not deliver funds to a client when the lawyer is not
authorized to deliver the funds. 5 In all other cases, the lawyer must abide
by the client's instructions.
1. Disputes with Clients
A lawyer should withdraw funds from client trust accounts only when
the lawyer and the client have clearly agreed that: (1) the lawyer has a right
to withdraw the funds for that purpose; (2) the amount proposed to be
withdrawn is the correct amount; and (3) the time for withdrawal is
appropriate." 7
When a dispute arises, Rule 1.15(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct requires that the portion of the funds in dispute be held "in
trust" while the lawyer suggests means for resolution of the dispute.08 The
undisputed amount should be "promptly distributed."5°9
These rules neither approve nor disapprove of a lawyer's liens but do
contemplate their existence. Rule 1.80)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest
500. In re Zagoria, 285 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. 1982).
501. Compare Doyle v. State Bar, 648 P.2d 942, 944 (Cal. 1982) (disciplining a lawyer
for failure to deliver a client's trust fund for ten months) and Jackson v. State Bar, 591 P.2d
47, 48 (Cal. 1979) (disciplining lawyer for refusing to account to the heirs of an estate for
five years).
502. The Florida Bar v. Brennan, 411 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1982).
503. The Florida Bar v. Rogowski, 399 So. 2d 1390 (Fla. 1981).
504. See In re Cassidy, 432 N.E.2d 274, 275 (I11. 1982) (holding that a lawyer should
not deliver funds to a client when a lien exists on the funds); Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb,
657 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Idaho 1983) (providing that a lawyer should not disperse funds to a
client when a client assigns the funds to a third party).
505. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 617 P.2d 80, 83 (Haw. 1980)
(determining that a lawyer should not disburse funds to an heir without court approval when
acting as the executor); In re Power, 451 A.2d 666, 667 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a lawyer
should not disburse escrow funds to a clerk without verifying the opposing parties approval).
506. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 42, at 1.15:303.
507. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 182.
508. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(c).
509. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(c).
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in a cause of action but makes an exception for "a lien granted by law to
secure the lawyer's fee or expense." There were two kinds of liens
recognized by the common law: (1) a "retaining lien [which] applies to a
client's property in the lawyer's possession" and (2) a "charging lien
[which] applies to a judgment or settlement the client recovers through the
lawyer's efforts." Whether asserting the retaining lien violates the lawyer's
contemporary duties to the client is an open question.10
Arkansas has codified only a version of the charging lien."' Sections
16-22-302 and 16-22-303 of the Arkansas Code make it clear that Arkansas
follows the minority rule by allowing discharged lawyers to assert a lien
based on the agreement with the client and by not restricting the lawyer to
a quantum meruit recovery. 2 The lien attaches to the client's cause of
action or counterclaim, and any settlement, etc., in the client's favor in any
person's possession. 13 By its terms, the statute does not seem to cover
funds on deposit with the lawyer. Absent a separate fund on which to make
a claim, a lawyer cannot use the statutory lawyer's lien to recover fees.
Claiming a retaining lien would also be problematical. In Henry,
Walden & Davis v. Goodman"4 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
lawyer's lien statute then in effect did not require a contract-based recovery.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted Goodman to stand for the
proposition that the only common law remedy available to a lawyer suing
on a contingent fee contract is quantum meruit. 51' The court indicated that
it might be willing to reconsider its analysis in Goodman but, because none
of the parties had requested such a reconsideration, it was unwilling to do
SO.
5 16
The Arkansas Supreme Court limited the application of the above
statute to situations where the lawyer has been discharged without cause.517
The client discharged his lawyers after he became disenchanted with their
work on his case."' He hired new lawyers and eventually received a
settlement of his claim. His former lawyers sought payment for the time
expended on the case according to the contract.5 9 The Arkansas Supreme
510. See Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Attorney's Assertion of Retaining Lien as
Violation of Ethical Code or Rules Governing Professional Conduct, 69 A.L.R. 4th 846
(1989).
511. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-304(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1991).
512. Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 16, 786 S.W.2d 573, 575 (1990).
513. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-304(a)(1).
514. Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987).
515. Lancaster v. Fitzhugh, 310 Ark. 590, 592, 839 S.W.2d 192, 193 (1992).
516. Id. at 591, 839 S.W.2d at 193-94.
517. Crockett & Brown v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 365, 849 S.W.2d 938, 940 (1993).
518. Id. at 365, 849 S.W.2d at 939.
519. Id.
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Court found that the lawyers were discharged with cause; nevertheless, the
court upheld the contract-based award. 20 Justice Dudley issued a vigorous
dissent in which he argued that a lawyer who is discharged for cause is
entitled only to a fee in proportion to the amount that the lawyer's actions
benefitted the client.521
2. Duties Upon Termination of Representation
Rule 1.16(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct requires the
lawyer to protect the client's interests by, among other things, "surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any
advance fee payment that has not been earned. 522 The majority rule is that
upon termination of the representation a lawyer may not withdraw funds
from the client trust account. 23 The client must agree on the right of the
lawyer to make any withdrawal, the amount to be withdrawn, and the time
of the withdrawal. 24 The lawyer must also return the client's property and
papers.
5 25
3. Accounting
Rule 1.1 5(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct states that
"upon request by the client or third person, [a lawyer] shall promptly render
a full accounting regarding [a client or third party's property or funds]. 526
A lawyer who notified his client of the fact of a settlement but who never
gave an accurate report of the amount received was subject to discipline. 27
520. Id. at 367, 849 S.W.2d at 940.
521. Id. at 372, 849 S.W.2d at 943 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-303 (Michie Supp.
1991)). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 445, § 52 (holding that a lawyer forfeits his right to
compensation if the lawyer unreasonably withdraws or is discharged for reasonable cause).
Cf. Haskins Law Firm v. American Nat'l Property & Casualty Co., 304 Ark. 684, 804
S.W.2d 714 (1991) (entering into a contract with the client's new lawyer for a specific
amount, the law firm bargained away its statutory right to rely on the original contract with
the client).
522. Id.
523. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Bratton, 413 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1982); In re Sawyer, 656 P.2d
503, 504 (Wash. 1983).
524. See, e.g., Bar Ass'n v. Carruth, 319 A.2d 532, 535 (Md. 1974); In re Rabb, 374
A.2d 461, 463 (N.J. 1977).
525. Arens v. Committee on Professional Conduct, 307 Ark. 308, 315, 820 S.W.2d 263,
266-67 (1991). It is interesting to note that there is no mention in the record of where the
$60,000 fee was deposited. If the fee had been deposited in the lawyer's general office
account, it would have been grounds for disciplinary action. See ARPC, supra note 15, Rule
1.15.
526. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.15(b).
527. McCray v. State Bar, 696 P.2d 83, 90 (Cal. 1985).
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Refusing to render a full accounting unless paid in advance for the time
necessary to complete the accounting is also a violation.2 8
Rule 1.5(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct provides for
a specific accounting in cases involving contingent fees.529 As an initial
matter, the fee agreement must be in writing and state the percentages that
will accrue to the lawyer and whether any expenses are to be deducted
before the calculation of the contingent fee. 3° When the case is completed,
the lawyer must provide the client a written statement detailing the outcome
of the matter and, if successful, the amount to be remitted to the client and
how that amount was determined."s3
V. CONCLUSION
Because lawyers are fiduciaries for their clients, they must act with care
when handling their client's money. The duties to segregate client funds
and to return unearned fees implies a prohibition on nonrefundable fees.
The new IOLTA rules now require lawyers to deposit nominal funds in
interest-bearing accounts. Although most lawyers comply with these
requirements, some do not. Even still, most lawyers who fail to comply are
not dishonest. They are often overworked, careless, or uninformed. David
Hoffman wrote that lawyers must be careful in their adherence to their
minor duties because "culpable ambition, false pride, the love of lucre, and
even dishonesty, sometimes make silent, insidious, and almost imperceptible
inroads. 5 32 Hoffman realized that lawyers need something more practical
than moral exhortation. His fiftieth and final resolution is the nineteenth
century equivalent of continuing legal education: "I will read the foregoing
forty-nine resolutions, twice every year, during my professional life. 5 33
528. In re Hetzel, 346 N.W.2d 782, 783 (Wis. 1984) (refusing to render an accounting
of the client's funds constituted professional misconduct).
529. ARPC, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(c).
530. ARPC, supra note 15.
531. ARPC, supra note 15.
532. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 744-45.
533. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 775.
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